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BEYOND THE UNREALISTIC SOLUTION FOR 
DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED BY THE APPENDIX 
OF THE BERNE CONVENTION ON COPYRIGHT 
 
Alberto J. Cerda Silva 
ABSTRACT 
 
The standards of copyright protection promoted by the Berne Convention 
are highly problematic for developing countries because these countries 
need to ensure a wide dissemination of works for teaching, scholarship, and 
research purposes. In order to accommodate these needs and to promote 
accession to this Convention, the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention, 
included an Appendix that allowed developing countries to issue 
compulsory licenses for translating and/or reproducing foreign works into 
languages of general use in their territories. Unfortunately, the Appendix 
has not met the needs of developing countries, which, instead, have relied 
on idiosyncratic solutions. Additionally, the instrument does not provide 
solutions for other needs, such as those of linguistic and cultural minorities, 
and it is arguable whether the Appendix applies online.  
Section one of this paper provides background information on the needs of 
developing countries and shows how the Appendix of the Berne Convention 
tried to meet them. Section two analyzes the main limitations of the 
mechanism of compulsory licensing adopted by the Appendix. Although, 
                                                          

 Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Professor of Law and Technology at the University of Chile Law 
School. LL.M. in International Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law Center, 2010; 
Master in Public Law, University of Chile, 2003; Bachelor in Law and Social Sciences, 
University of Chile, 1999. E-mail: acerda@uchile.cl An earlier version of this article was 
presented at the "Theoretical Foundations of Intellectual Property" Seminar by Professor 
Julie E. Cohen at Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 2011. The author thanks 
Professor Cohen for her highly valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
article. Priceless feedback was also provided by James Love, Manon Ress, Michelle 
Ueland, and attendants to both the Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public 
Interest (Aug. 25-27, 2011) and the DC-area S.J.D. Paper Roundtable (Dec. 7, 2011), both 
events organized by American University Washington College of Law. Mistakes are 
wholly and exclusive responsibility of the author. 
2 Beyond the Appendix of the Berne Convention  
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
the mere fact that the Appendix does not comply with its very purpose 
should be enough to warrant a new instrument, section three discusses two 
additional reasons in favor of adopting a new instrument to meet the needs 
of developing countries. In particular, this section focuses on general 
welfare and the economic benefits for authors and right holders. Finally, 
section four outlines the issues that should be included in a new instrument 
that effectively meets development needs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The standards of copyright protection promoted by the Berne 
Convention are highly problematic for developing countries because these 
countries need to ensure a wide dissemination of works for teaching, 
scholarship, and research purposes. In order to accommodate these needs 
and to promote accession to this Convention, the 1971 Paris Act of the 
Berne Convention included an Appendix that allowed developing countries 
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to issue compulsory licenses for translating and/or reproducing foreign 
works into languages of general use in their territories. 
The increasing number of developing countries that have become parties 
to the Berne Convention may suggest that the mechanism provided by the 
Appendix meets some of the aforementioned needs. Reviewing domestic 
copyright legislations of those countries shows, however, that their laws do 
not rely on the provisions of the Appendix and have rather developed 
idiosyncratic solutions. Moreover, the Appendix does not address the needs 
of linguistic and cultural minorities in both developed and developing 
countries. It is also arguable whether the Appendix applies to online works. 
A new instrument should resolve these limitations by providing real 
solutions for the needs of developing countries and linguistic minorities. 
This paper proposes what issues should be included in that new instrument. 
Section one of this paper provides background information on the needs 
of developing countries and shows how the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention tried to meet them. Section two analyzes the main limitations of 
the mechanism of compulsory licensing adopted by the Appendix. 
Although, the mere fact that the Appendix does not comply with its very 
purpose should be enough to warrant a new instrument, section three 
discusses two additional reasons in favor of adopting a new instrument to 
meet the needs of developing countries. In particular, this section focuses on 
general welfare and the economic benefits for authors and right holders. 
Finally, section four outlines the issues that should be included in a new 
instrument that effectively meets development needs. 
 
II. THE BERNE CONVENTION’S APPENDIX 
In 1886, European countries agreed to provide a common minimum legal 
standard of protection for copyrighted works through the adoption of the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
1
 Even 
though some non-European countries were parties to the Convention, they 
did so under their colonial status. The actual parties in interest were France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As a result, the 
Convention reflects the interests of these latter countries in achieving an 
adequate level of protection, particularly with respect to their potential 
colonial markets. Since then, the Convention has undergone successive 
                                                          
1
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sep. 9, 1886, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised in Paris, France, Jul. 24, 1971) [hereinafter 
Berne Convention]. 
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revisions. The Berlin revision of 1908
2
 is the most significant because it 
dispensed with formalities by adopting a system of automatic protection and 
set forth a minimum term of protection – the life of the author plus fifty 
years post mortem.
3
 
The newly independent countries of the Americas also adopted their own 
system for protecting copyrights. Since 1889, through the Treaty of 
Montevideo and successive instruments,
4
 countries in the Americas created 
more flexible system of protection to better suit their needs. The Inter-
American system left domestic laws to determine the length of the term of 
protection and required registration of works for copyright protection.
5
 
Works that did not comply with these formalities were abandoned to the 
public domain. In addition, as a general policy, countries of the Americas 
refused European countries entry into the Inter American system, 
effectively denying protection to works by their former colonizers.
6
 A more 
relaxed standard of protection and the refusal to protect European works are 
both signs of “differing interests regarding printed works.”7 Countries in the 
Americas rejected European hegemony and claimed legal obstacles to adopt 
the European copyright model. In reality, however, these countries were 
convinced that this model was inconvenient for culture-importing 
countries.
8
 
After World War II, the progressive decolonization of Africa and Asia 
diminished the efficacy of the Berne Convention. The Convention’s 
“colonial clause” was supposed to provide continuity of copyright 
protection in decolonized territories. The clause, however, was insufficient 
to meet this goal because it still required the new former colonies to either 
ratify or withdraw from the Convention.
9
 Since the high standards of the 
                                                          
2
 Id.  (as revised at Berlin, Germany, Nov. 13, 1908). 
3
 Id. at art. 7 (as revised at Brussels, Belgium, Jun. 26, 1948) (this period became 
mandatory in the 1948 Brussels Act). 
4
 Montevideo Copyright Convention on Literary and Artistic Property, Jan. 11, 1889, 
171 C.T.S. 453. 
5
 See Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific and 
Artistic Works, Jun. 22, 1946, O.A.S.T.S. No. 39 (showing that only in 1946 did the Inter-
American System abolish the formalities). 
6
 See Ulrich Uchtenhagen, Acerca de la Historia de las Convenciones de Derechos de 
Autor Latinoamericanas, in LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS DE AUTOR EN EL SISTEMA 
INTERAMERICANO 71, 78-80.  
7
 Id. 
8
 See Delia Lipszyc, Esquema de la Protección Internacional del Derecho de Autor por 
las Convenciones del Sistema Interamericano, in LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS DE 
AUTOR EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO, supra note 6, at 20; See also ARCADIO PLAZAS, 
Estudios Sobre Derecho de Autor: Reforma Legal Colombiana [Study on Author’s Rights: 
Legal Reform in Colombia], 102-03 (1984) (referring to a general “isolationism” of Latin-
American countries in relation to their international commitments on copyright). 
9
 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 31. 
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Convention did not meet the expectations of these new developing 
countries, they had little incentive to become parties. 
At that time, and still today, developing countries need to disseminate 
knowledge on a wide basis. The artificial scarcity created by copyright law 
prevents the achievement of this goal. The high prices of works published 
overseas hamper the implementation of public policies for the extensive use 
of copyrighted works to promote educational, cultural, and technical 
development. Public purchases and voluntary licensing have not met those 
needs because the fees charged are unreasonable in the context of limited 
economic resources in developing countries. To become parties to the Berne 
Convention, developing countries required appropriate flexibilities for 
satisfying those needs.
10
 
Although the Berne Convention does offer some flexibilities, these run 
short of meeting the needs of developing countries. For instance, the 
Convention allows access to copyrighted works through exceptions and 
limitations. Established in domestic legislations, exceptions and limitations 
dispense with the requirements of consent from and/or payment to the rights 
holders. These exceptions, however, are severely limited by the so-called 
Berne three-step test which establishes that exceptions must be (1) limited 
to special cases, (2) do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work, 
and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.
11
 This test prevents the extensive use of works by countries because, 
even if the policy rationale is more altruistic and urgent than providing mere 
entertainment in small restaurants,
12
 the test arguably disallows massive use 
of copyrighted works with regards to education. 
                                                          
10
 See Irwin A. Olian, Jr., International Copyrights and the Need of Developing 
Countries: The Awakening at Stockholm and Paris, 7 Cornell Int’l L. J. 81, 88-95 (1974) 
(describing the needs of developing countries by the time of the adoption of the Paris Act 
of the Berne Convention). See generally PETER DRAHOS AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 74-79, (2002) 
(describing historical and current challenges and limitations that developing countries face 
for accessing works in compliance with international instruments on copyright).  
11
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2) (permitting the reproduction of works 
under the expressed circumstances); see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement] (adopting a similar test, but extending its scope beyond reproduction 
and requiring not unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interests of the rights holder). 
12
 See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, document 
WT/DS160/R (Jun. 15, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/1234da.pdf (deciding that this section 
infringes on the Berne-three step test when it releases restaurants and other businesses that 
play music for the public from paying royalties to the original artists under specific 
conditions). 
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Another flexibility provided by the Berne Convention to all its parties is 
the so-called “ten-year regime” clause, an optional early lapsing of 
protection for some works. The provision allows a State party to end the 
protection of the exclusive right of translation if a given work is not 
available in a language of general use in the said country within ten years 
from the work’s first publication.13 As a result, the work enters into the 
public domain in that country and anyone is allowed to exploit it. This 
result may facilitate meeting the needs of developing countries because it 
enables the massive use of works for educational purposes. The “ten-year 
regime” flexibility, however, is not satisfactory for several reasons. First, 
this provision intends to entice countries to become part of the Berne 
Convention, not to meet the needs of developing countries.  Countries are, 
in fact, only allowed to enjoy this exception by making a reservation when 
they become party to the Convention.
14
 Second, nothing in the Convention 
prevents countries from retaliating against authors from countries that have 
implemented this provision.
15
 Third, the mechanism provided by the “ten-
year regime” is incompatible with special provisions in the Appendix that 
allow developing countries to issue compulsory licenses.
16
 Last but not 
least, this flexibility delays access to works for a significant amount of time. 
Although a delay may not be a serious problem in social sciences and 
philosophy, it is unacceptable in other fields, such as technology, computer 
science, epidemiology, oncology, and medicine. As a result of those 
limitations, countries that become parties to the Berne Convention have 
rarely made the aforementioned reservation and, therefore, this exception 
has become useless.
17
 
                                                          
13
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(b) (setting special provisions on 
translation rights for acceding countries), Appendix, art. V (establishing that acceding 
developing countries can chose between the ten year regime and the compulsory licensing 
system set forth in the Appendix, but cannot combine those choices).   
14
 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], GUIDE TO THE BERNE 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 
172 (1978) [hereinafter WIPO Guide] (ratifying that the ten-year regime is an available 
irrevocable choice that must be made at the time of ratifying or acceding to the 
Convention). 
15
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(b) (stating that “any country has the 
right to apply, in relation to the right of translation of works whose country of origin is a 
country availing itself of such a reservation, a protection which is equivalent to the 
protection granted by the latter country”). 
16
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. V. 
17
 See WIPO, Berne Convention Contracting Parties and Notifications 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (last visited: Nov. 26, 2011) 
[hereinafter Contracting Parties] (showing that since the adoption of the 1971 Paris Act of 
the Berne Convention only a few countries have reserved the right to lapse protection for 
non-translated works: Slovenia and some successors of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia). 
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In 1952, under UNESCO sponsorship, the Universal Copyright 
Convention was adopted to overcome the gap between the needs of 
developing countries and the protection promoted by the European 
nations.
18
 This Convention provided a bridge to the higher standards of the 
Berne Convention by adopting some flexibilities, including exceptions, 
limitations, and a shorter term of protection.
19
 The bridge, however, was 
one-way because it did not allow movement from the Berne Convention to 
the Universal Convention.
20
 This solution was unsatisfactory because it did 
not encourage developing countries to join the Berne Convention standards 
and, at the same time, it did not prevent the few developing countries that 
were already parties from withdrawing from the Berne Convention. 
Therefore, working out a different solution became imperative. 
A first attempt at agreeing on a mechanism to insert flexibilities into the 
Berne Convention was the 1967 Stockholm Act.
21
 The flexibilities included 
in this protocol were based on the expiration of copyright protection for 
foreign works that were not translated into the relevant language of a given 
developing country.
22
 The lack of ratification of the protocol, particularly 
by developed countries, quickly evidenced the Act’s uselessness.23 A 
second attempt concluded with the simultaneous adoption of almost 
identical modifications by the Universal Copyright Convention and their 
inclusion in the Appendix of the Berne Convention via the 1971 Paris Act.
24
 
                                                          
18
 See Universal Copyright Convention, Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII 
and Resolution concerning Article XI, Sep. 6, 1952, 68 Stat. 1030, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 
[hereinafter UCC]. 
19
 See  DELIA LIPSZYC, COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 604-05, 751 
(1999) (referring to the Universal Copyright Convention as a first step in the process of 
accessing to the Berne Convention); RICARDO ANTEQUERA, EL NUEVO DERECHO DE 
AUTOR EN VENEZUELA 572 (1994) (referring to the Universal Copyright Convention as a 
bridge to the Berne Convention). 
20
 See id; UCC supra note 18, Appendix Declaration on Article XVII.  
21
 Berne Convention, supra note 1 (as revised at Stockholm, Jul. 14, 1967). 
22
 For background, analysis and aftermaths of the Stockholm Act of the Berne 
Convention, see SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 590-630 (1987); SAM RICKETSON AND JANE 
C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE 
CONVENTION AND BEYOND 881–924 (2006); see generally CARLOS MOUCHET, EL 
DERECHO DE AUTOR INTERNACIONAL EN UNA ENCRUCIJADA (1969); Ndéné Ndiaye, The 
Berne Convention and Developing Countries, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47 (1986-
1987). 
23
 See Peter DRAHOS and John BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 77. 
24
 See Eugen Ulmer, The Revisions of the Copyright Conventions, 2 INT’L REV.  INTELL. 
PROP. AND COMPETITION L. 345, 347 (1971) (stating that “with isolated exceptions and 
apart from the arrangement of the two systems, the substantive provisions common to both 
Conventions (rules governing exception to the rights of translation and reproduction) were 
drafted in identical terms”).  
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Ever since, both international instruments have provided developing 
countries with a mechanism of flexibilities that allows issuing compulsory 
licenses for translating and/or reproducing published copyrighted works, as 
explained below.
25
 
The Appendix compulsory licensing system is specifically designed for 
developing countries. Countries interested in implementing the system need 
to qualify as developing countries according to the practices of the United 
Nations, and periodically notify the Director General of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
26
 In addition, even if the 
Appendix provisions were self-executing,
27
 countries still need to 
incorporate several provisions into domestic law. For instance, rules 
determining the competent authority to issue licenses, application 
procedures, and safeguards for right holders, among others. Overall, to be 
fully operative, the mechanism adopted by the Appendix requires notifying 
the Director General of WIPO and implementing measures into domestic 
law.
28
 
The competent authority of a given developing country may issue non-
exclusive non-transferable compulsory licenses for
29
 (a) translating a work 
into a language of general use in the country and publishing it in printed or 
other analogous form, for teaching, scholarship or research purposes;
30
 
and/or (b) reproducing a published work in printed or other analogous form 
for use in connection with systematic instructional activities.
31
 For 
translation, there is a waiting period that varies depending on the language 
of the original work. For reproduction, the waiting period depends on 
whether the work is technical or not. 
The Appendix adopts several safeguards in favor of right holders. In 
addition to the aforementioned requirements for obtaining a license for 
translating and/or reproducing a protected work, a potential licensee must 
be a national of the country that issues the license. Before obtaining a 
                                                          
25
 But see Olian, supra note 10, at 109 (arguing that, in fact, even though the 
Convention introduced a regime for compulsory licensing in favor of developing countries, 
the Paris Act’s ultimate goal was unifying the systems of the Berne Convention and the 
Universal Copyright Convention rather than designing a solution for developing countries). 
26
 Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. I (1) and (2). 
27
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 36 (1) (setting forth that whether the 
provisions of Convention are self-executing is a determination of domestic law). 
28
 See PLAZAS, supra note 8, at 166. 
29
 Additionally, the Appendix set forth a compulsory license for broadcasting in 
developing countries on the underlying idea that those countries might take advantage of 
providing education through the broadcasting system. However, this licensing is not 
analyzed for purposes of this paper, which focuses on the translation and reproduction of 
printed material rather than on its broadcast. 
30
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. II. 
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compulsory license, the potential licensee must find the right holder and try 
to obtain a voluntary license from her/him. After the compulsory license has 
been issued, works must indicate in each copy that they are available under 
the Appendix provisions. Additional regulations must ensure the quality of 
the translation, accuracy of the reproduction, and payment of a fair 
compensation consistent with royalty standards regarding freely negotiated 
licenses between persons in the two relevant countries. Except in some 
limited circumstances, exporting the work is prohibited. If the work 
becomes available at a reasonable price through the rights holder or if the 
country that issued the license no longer classifies as a developing country, 
the compulsory license must cease, but existing copies may be distributed 
until their stock is exhausted.
32
  
The Appendix proscribes Convention Members from retaliating against 
countries that issue compulsory licenses.
33
 This guarantee was unanimously 
agreed upon to prevent countries from resorting to the breach of their own 
obligations under the Convention in order to inhibit other countries from 
issuing these licenses.
34
 Therefore, unlike the ten-year regime clause, right 
holders whose countries of origin have issued compulsory licenses should 
not fear lesser protection in other countries whose authors have been 
affected by the compulsory licenses issued by the right holder’s own 
country.
35
  
In sum, the Appendix of the Berne Convention intends to provide a 
solution for developing countries. The Appendix authorizes developing 
countries to issue non-exclusive and non-transferable licenses to translate 
and/or reproduce works published in printed or analogous forms for 
satisfying domestic educational and research needs. Issuing these licenses is 
subject to the condition that right holders receive fair compensation. In this 
sense, the Appendix enables developing countries to ensure a wider 
                                                                                                                                                   
31
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. III. 
32
 See  Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. I (4), II (6), and III (6). 
33
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. I(6)(a); see also UNESCO 
Conference for Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention, Paris, 1973, Report of the 
General Repporteur [sic] of the Universal Copyright Convention, ¶¶ 58 – 59 [hereinafter 
Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention 1973] (explaining a similar implicit 
provision in relation with the compulsory licensing system granted by the Universal 
Copyright Convention). 
34
 See Ulmer, supra note 24, at 356. 
35
 See WIPO Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention Paris, 
Jul. 5-24, 1971, General Report of Paris Conference, ¶ 28 [hereinafter General Report of 
Paris Conference 1971] (noting that this guarantee is without prejudice of the right of any 
country to apply the comparison of terms clause, also known as the rule of the shorter 
term). 
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dissemination of knowledge through textbooks, manuals, etc. for teaching, 
scholarship or research purposes.
36
 
III. LIMITATIONS OF THE APPENDIX MECHANISM 
After some years in force, the Appendix apparently achieved its political 
goal of making the Convention more appealing to developing countries, 
which have adhered to it under the promise of benefiting from the 
provisions especially tailored for them. In 1970, the year before the 
adoption of the Appendix, there were only 58 signatory countries to the 
Convention. Of these, 21 were OECD members (all-OECD members except 
the United States), and 28 were European countries. Notably, after the 
adoption of the Appendix, as shown in figure 1, the number of parties has 
continuously increased through the years and expanded across the world. 
Today, the Convention has 164 Members.
37
 This success may suggest the 
Appendix of the Berne Convention provided an effective solution for 
developing countries. Such a conclusion is inaccurate for the reasons 
explained below. 
Developing countries have become parties to the Berne Convention 
because of the TRIPS Agreement. Until 1990, only 83 countries were 
parties to the Convention. The number has since then doubled due to the 
negotiations of what would become the World Trade Organization, which 
requires its members to join the Berne Convention. Therefore, a significant 
number of countries may have joined the Convention not because they 
agree with its standards but because they wish access markets for their 
agricultural goods.
38
 Regardless of the reason for joining the Convention, 
when analyzing the real application and challenges of the Appendix, it 
becomes clear that the Appendix does not create a mechanism that 
developing countries can use to address the problems associated with their 
stage of development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 See WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at 153. 
37
 Contracting Parties, supra note 17. 
38
 See Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-
79 (2006) (describing the four different narratives used to explain the origins of the TRIPS 
Agreement and why developing countries became parties). 
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Figure 1: Berne Convention and OECD Members, 1970 - 2010 
SOURCE: WIPO and OECD websites, 2011. 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention does not work because it does not 
meet the needs of developing countries. Instead, the Appendix comes across 
as an obsolete, inappropriate, bureaucratic, and extremely limited attempt to 
provide an air valve for developing countries. The following pages describe 
and analyze some objections to the provisions of the Appendix in order to 
inform a proposal for amending it –which is also discussed below. 
A. The Appendix Does Not Work for Developing Countries 
The assumption that developing countries already have a solution 
contrasts with the actual (non-)use of the Appendix and the relevant 
domestic copyright laws. First, only a handful of countries have notified the 
Director General of the WIPO of their interest in the Appendix provisions. 
Second, several countries that have introduced in their domestic law similar 
mechanisms to that of the Appendix have not notified the Director General 
of the WIPO of such adoption because of the mechanism’s uselessness. 
Instead, countries have adopted idiosyncratic solutions into their domestic 
law to mitigate the limitations of the mechanism provided by the Berne 
Convention. 
A small number of developing countries have availed themselves to use 
the flexibilities provided by the Appendix. As was mentioned before, 
countries must periodically notify the Director General of the WIPO which, 
in turn, allows them to issue compulsory licenses according to the 
Appendix.
39
 In fact, as of 2011, the WIPO’s online registry of notifications 
                                                          
39
 Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. I (1) and (2) (requiring the renew of 
self-availing by notification to the Director General of the WIPO each 10 years). 
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states that only 15 of the 164 parties of the Convention have availed 
themselves to enjoy the benefit of these compulsory licenses.
40
 Most of 
these are from Asia and the Middle East,
41
 plus one African and one Latin 
American country.
42
 Most of these countries are newcomers to the 
international copyright forum that joined the Convention in the context of 
becoming parties to TRIPS and intended to benefit from the Appendix 
flexibilities. 
Notifying WIPO, does not by itself make the compulsory licensing 
mechanism functional for a developing country. The mechanism must be 
properly implemented into domestic law. Several countries that have 
notified WIPO have yet to implement compulsory licensing for translation 
and/or reproduction into their domestic law. This is the case of Mongolia,
43
 
Oman,
44
 Philippines,
45
 Samoa,
46
 Sri Lanka,
47
 Uzbekistan,
48
 and Yemen
49
 
                                                          
40
 See Notifications on the Berne Convention, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&search_what=N&treaty_id=15 
(last visited: May 15, 2011). 
41
 VICTOR NABHAN, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS, STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATIONAL 
PURPOSES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES 56-57 (2009), available at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_19/sccr_19_6.doc (identifying several 
countries that have implemented Appendix-like licensing systems into their domestic law, 
but clarifying that “scant or even non-existent” results, have rendered these systems  “dead 
letter”). 
42
 Availed countries are: Bangladesh, Cuba, Jordan, Mongolia, Oman, Philippines, 
Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arabs Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, 
and Yemen. 
43
 See Law of Mongolia on Copyright and Related Rights art 24, (Jan. 19, 1993) (setting 
for mere copyright exceptions and limitations, but any compulsory licensing for translation 
and reproduction). 
44
 See Royal Decree No. 65/2008 Promulgating the Law on Copyright and Related 
Rights art. 20 of 17 May 2008 (Oman) (recognizing barely some extremely limited 
exceptions, essentially for reproductions, but any compulsory licensing). 
45
 See Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 8293, §§ 176.1, 184-
85, 237 (1997) (Phil), (setting for several exceptions, including one for public use by the 
government, the National Library, or by educational institutions; fair use exceptions; 
requiring governmental approval for using any work of the Government); See also, 
VICENTE AMADOR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FUNDAMENTALS 398-99 (2007) (referring to 
the latter provision and expressing that that use “may” require payment of royalties); 
Jacinto D. Jimenez, Intellectual Property Law in Philippines, in 42 International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws 3, 43-48 (2007) (describing the wide system of limitations and 
exceptions in Philippine law, but no mention to a compulsory licensing system currently in 
force); RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMENTS AND 
ANNOTATIONS 109 (2006) (referring to § 239 that repealed the old copyright law, including 
a provision that authorized compulsory licensing for reprinting needed expensive foreign 
books). However, the Intellectual Property Code prescribes that Philippines shall avail 
itself of the special provisions regarding developing countries, including provisions for 
licenses grantable by competent authority under the Appendix.  
46
 See Copyright Act 1998 arts. 8 – 10, 1998 (Samoa) (providing some narrow 
exceptions for reproduction for education and research purposes, but no compulsory 
license); see also, Sue Farran, South Pacific Intellectual Property Law, 51 International 
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that barely have some copyright exceptions and limitations. Other countries 
that have notified WIPO, have implemented both exceptions and a 
compulsory licensing mechanism that differs significantly from the 
Appendix. For instance, the United Arab Emirates has a flexible 
compulsory licensing mechanism.
50
 Sudan
51
 and Syria
52
 have a general 
compulsory licensing regime for using copyrighted works based on reasons 
of public interest. Cuba has a similar system that is royalty free;
53
 Vietnam 
also has a similar system that does not mention payment.
54
 Jordan has a 
public interest compulsory license that is limited to publication and 
republication, recognizes fair compensation,
55
 and also a license system 
                                                                                                                                                   
Encyclopaedia of Laws, Kluwer International, 1, 36 – 38 (2006) (discussing limitations and 
exceptions in the copyright law of South Pacific’s countries, including Samoa, but omitting 
any mention to a Samoan compulsory licensing system). 
47
 See Intellectual Property Act, No. 36 of 2003 (Sri Lanka); See also, D.M. 
KARUNARATNA, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN SRI 
LANKA, 76 – 90 (2006) (analyzing limitations and exceptions, and fair use in Sri Lankan 
domestic law, but omitting any reference to a compulsory licensing system).  
48
 See Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Copyright and Related Rights, art. 26, 
2006 (reproducing an exception available in its previous copyright law that barely set forth 
an exception for purposes of research, criticism or information in the form of quotations 
from disclosed works in the original language or in translation). 
49
 See Intellectual Property Law No. 19, 1994, art. 38 (Yemen) (setting for a 
compulsory license for public domain works, but any for translation). 
50
 See Federal Law No. 7 of the Year 2002 Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring 
Rights (U.A.E.) art. 21 (setting forth a soft-regulated compulsory license for translation 
and/or reproduction of works). 
51
 See Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996 (Sudan), §§ 14, 20(1) 
(setting forth several limited exceptions, essentially for reproduction, including one for 
translation for personal and private use and providing a compulsory license, according to 
which, in case of public interest, government may require right holder publication of a 
work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation)[hereinafter Sudan 
Copyright Law].  
52
 See Law No. 12/2001 §§ 21, 37 of 27 Feb. 2001 (Copyright Law of Syria) (setting 
forth several exceptions that allow the reproduction of works in its source language or its 
translation, including some for educational and research purposes and adopting a 
compulsory license; in case of public interest, government may require right holder 
publication of a work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation).  
53
 See Ley No. 14 del Derecho de Autor [Copyright Act], updated, art. 37, 1977 (Cuba) 
(setting forth a compulsory license without payment for public utility reasons).  
54
 See Intellectual Property Law No. 50/2005/QH11, Nov. 29, 2005 (Viet.) arts. 7, 25, 
42-43 (setting forth a compulsory license for using works based on reason of public 
interest, adopting an exception for reproduction, but not translation of works, remitting 
public domain to governmental regulation, and establishing works which copyright is hold 
by the state); see also, Decree No. 100/2006/ND-CP Detailing and Guiding the 
Implementation of a Number of Articles of the Civil Code and the Intellectual Property 
Law Regarding the Copyright and Related Rights (Sep. 21, 2006), art. 29 (Viet.) (clarifying 
that licenses and payments are required for state works, but not for public domain ones). 
55
 See Law No. 22 of 1992 on the Protection of Copyright and its Amendments 
(Jordan), as amended by Amending Law No. 9 of 2005, art. 27. 
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similar to the Appendix mechanism.
56
 The latter licensing system has been 
adopted by Bangladesh
57
 and Thailand.
58
 In sum, compulsory licensing in 
compliance with the Appendix has been implemented only in three of the 
countries that have notified WIPO: Jordan, Bangladesh, and Thailand. 
The Appendix has not succeeded among the countries that have notified 
WIPO’s General Director of their interest in using the mechanism. Only 
three of these fifteen developing countries have implemented the 
mechanism into domestic law. Additional research is needed to determine if 
those three countries are actually using the mechanism. It may be argued 
that developing countries have merely neglected renewing their notification 
to WIPO. The countries have actually implemented the mechanism into 
domestic law and are enjoying the benefits of the Appendix. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case. A review of the copyright laws of several developing 
countries in Africa and Latin America shows that they are not beneficiaries 
of the falsely generous Appendix provisions. 
African countries do not use the Appendix mechanism.
59
 Africa, as a 
continent, contributes 0.3% of the global book exports.
60
 According to 
recent research on copyright regulation in eight African countries, only 
                                                          
56
 See Law No. 22 of 1992 on the Protection of Copyright and its Amendments 
(Jordan), as amended by Amending Law No. 9 of 2005, art. 11 (setting forth a like-the-
Appendix compulsory license for translating and/or publishing “in a printed form or any 
other form” to the Arabic language). 
57
 See Copyright Act 2000 No. 28 of 2000 (as amended up to 2005) §§ 50-54 (Bangl.) 
(setting forth a compulsory license for using Bangladeshi works, adopting another 
compulsory license for Bangladeshi works by dead, unknown or his whereabouts is 
unknown to publish and translate them to any language and implementing the compulsory 
licensing system of the Appendix of the Berne Convention into domestic law); see also, 
MOHAMMAD MONIRUL AZAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WTO, AND BANGLADESH, 197 – 
201 (2008); and NAZNIN HOSSAIN AND SHARIFA AKTAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
114-124 (2009). 
58
 Copyright Act, B.E. 2537 (1994) (Thai.), §§ 54 – 55 (allowing government to issue 
compulsory licensing under requirements lightly more flexible than those of the Appendix 
of the Berne Convention); see also, Thailand, GLOBAL CONSUMERS NETWORK ON ACCESS 
TO KNOWLEDGE, BROADBAND, CONSUMER RIGHTS AND REPRESENTATION, 
http://a2knetwork.org/reports2009/thailand (last visited April 6, 2012) (reporting that these 
licenses are “very difficult to obtain”). 
59
 See JOSEPH FOMETEU, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS, STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 
FOR TEACHING IN AFRICA 42 (2009), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130241 (reporting some African 
countries that have adopted Appendix-like compulsory licenses, in spite of which not even 
one compulsory license has been issued).  
60
 See CENTRO REGIONAL PARA EL FOMENTO DEL LIBRO EN AMÉRICA LATINA, EL 
CARIBE, ESPAÑA Y PORTUGAL (CERLALC), EL ESPACIO IBEROAMERICANO DEL LIBRO 
2010, 100 (2010) [hereinafter Fomento del Libro America Latina].  
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Uganda has implemented the Appendix compulsory licensing system.
61
 In 
spite of not even being a party to the Berne Convention, Uganda has 
implemented the Appendix provisions into its domestic law in addition to 
other copyright limitations.
62
 Five other countries have barely implemented 
standard copyright limitations and exceptions: Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Morocco, and Senegal.
63
 Meanwhile, as explained earlier, Egypt and South 
Africa have not implemented the Appendix mechanism. Rather, both have 
implemented an idiosyncratic solution.
64
 Sudan is another country that 
adopted a peculiar solution that allows the government to order publishing a 
work based on public interest subject to royalty payments to the right 
holders.
65
  
Developing Latin-American countries do not use the Appendix 
mechanism either.
66
 According to the United Nations, in 2011, 33 of 35 
countries of the Americas, all but the United States and Canada, qualify as 
developing countries and, accordingly, potential users of the Appendix 
mechanism.
67
 But, according to WIPO’s register, only Cuba currently uses 
the mechanism.
68
 A brief collection of data for this paper shows, however, 
that six other countries in the region have implemented compulsory licenses 
for translation into their domestic laws despite not having notified WIPO. 
Some countries have adopted insubstantial provisions into their domestic 
laws that are ambiguous and insufficient to become operable. This is the 
                                                          
61
 ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT 327 (Armstrong et al, 
eds., 2010). 
62
 See Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act (2006) (Uganda), §§ 17 and 18 (setting 
forth a non-exclusive and non-transferable compulsory license for translation and/or 
reproduction of copyrighted works from foreign languages to English, Swahili or any 
Ugandan language), see also, Dick Kawooya, Ronald Kakungulu and Jeroline Akubu, 
Uganda, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 61, at 283, 288. 
63
 See ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA, supra note 61, at 326-327. 
64
 See, infra notes 112 – 116 and accompanying text (describing the Egyptian 
mechanisms); see also infra notes 94 – 97 and accompanying text (describing the South 
African provisions). 
65
 See, Sudan Copyright Law, supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
66
 See PLAZAS, supra note 8, at 211 (stating that, by the 80’s, the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention had not have any application within Latin America and the Caribbean). 
67
 U.N. Statistics Div., Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, 
geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings (Apr. 26, 2011),  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc (stating that “[t]here is no 
established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or 
areas in the United Nations system”, but, in common practice, Canada and the United 
States are considered "developed"). 
68
 Declaration by the Republic of Cuba Relating to Articles II and III of the Appendix to 
the Paris Act (1971), (Jun. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_238.html 
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case of El Salvador,
69
 Honduras,
70
 and Panama.
71
 There is no evidence that 
these countries have issued any compulsory licenses. The laws of 
Colombia,
72
 the Dominican Republic,
73
 and Mexico,
74
 in contrast, are better 
drafted and provide a sufficient legal regime for issuing compulsory 
licensing. There is no evidence, however, that these countries have issued 
any compulsory licenses either.   
In spite of having implementing laws, neither Colombia nor Mexico uses 
the Appendix mechanism. The Colombian competent authority has failed to 
notify WIPO and argues that the mechanism provided by its domestic 
copyright law is no longer in force because of its own negligence.
75
 As a 
                                                          
69
 See Decreto No. 604 Ley de Fomento y Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual [Law 
on the Promotion and Protection of Intellectual Property], art. 77, 1993, (El Sal.) (setting 
forth that the competent judge shall grant compulsory license for translation and 
reproduction set forth in international conventions ratified by the country, previous 
compliance with the requirements stated by them).  
70
 See Decreto 4-99-E, 2000, Ley del Derecho de Autor y de los Derechos Conexos 
[Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act], art. 122, 2006 (Hond.)(providing that 
government, through the Administrative Office for Copyright and Neighbor Rights, could 
grant non-exclusive license for the reproduction and translation of foreign works according 
to the provisions of articles 2 and 3 of the Appendix of the Berne Convention). 
71
 See Ley sobre el Derecho de Autor y Derechos Conexos [Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Act], 1994, art. 84 (Pan.) (allowing the authority designed by decree to grant non-
exclusive license to translate and reproduce foreign works for the purpose and in 
compliance with the requirements set forth by the Universal Copyright Convention and 
other international covenants ratified by Panama). 
72
 See Ley sobre Derechos de Autor [Copyright Act], feb. 19, 1982, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O] (Colom.), arts. 45 – 71 (setting forth a heavily regulated system of 
compulsory licenses for reproduction and translation of foreign works into Spanish). See 
also, MINISTERIO DE GOBIERNO (DE COLOMBIA), LOS DERECHOS DE AUTOR EN COLOMBIA 
(1982); and ERNESTO RENGIFO GARCÍA, PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL: EL MODERNO 
DERECHO DE AUTOR 178 (1996). 
73
 See L. No. 65-00 de Derecho de Autor [Copyright Act],  agosto. 24, 2000, Diario 
Oficial (Dom. Rep.); and, Decreto N° 362-01 que establece el reglamento de aplicación de 
la Ley N° 65-00 sobre Derecho de Autor [Decree on Implementing Regulations of the 
Copyright Act], art. 24,  mar. 14, 2001  (Dom. Rep.)(setting forth a regime for non-
exclusive and non-transferable compulsory licenses to translate and reproduce foreign 
works for the purposes and in compliance with the requirements of such licenses, according 
to the international treaties in which the Dominican Republic is a party).  
74
 See Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [Federal Law on Copyright], Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DO], 24 dic. de 1996, as consolidated jul. 2003 (Mex.), art. 147; and, 
Reglamento de la Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor [Regulation of the Federal Law of 
Copyright], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 22 de mayo de 1998, as amended Sep. 
14, 2005 (Mex.), arts. 38 – 43. See also, GABINO CASTREJÓN GARCÍA, TRATADO TEÓRICO-
PRÁCTICO DE LOS DERECHOS DE AUTOR Y DE LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL 102-105, 
(2001); and, FERNANDO SERRANO MIGALLÓN, NUEVA LEY FEDERAL DEL DERECHO DE 
AUTOR 163 (1998) (referring that even when the copyright act adopts a compulsory 
licensing bases on grounds of public interest, its regulation complies with international 
law). 
75
 See DIRECCIÓN NACIONAL DE DERECHO DE AUTOR, mayo 21, 2010, Legal Opinion 1-
2010-7340 (Colom.) (arguing that provisions of the copyright law on compulsory licenses 
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result, no compulsory license has ever been issued.
76
 In the case of Mexico, 
whose last notification to WIPO took place in 1984, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) set forth an additional requirement for 
issuing compulsory licenses. Under NAFTA, compulsory licenses shall not 
be issued if translation and reproduction needs can be met by voluntary 
actions of rights holder.
77
 Nevertheless, the non-use of the mechanism has 
not been a serious problem because despite of its longstanding 
implementation into domestic law,
78
 the mechanism was never used.
79
 
Although the reason for this lack of use is unclear, authorities suspect that 
costly paperwork and the limited scope of the licensing system undermined 
the mechanism’s potential usefulness.80 
Scholars tend to agree that the Appendix mechanism neither meets the 
expectations of developing countries, nor its own objectives. The 
mechanism has not produced any real improvement in access to copyrighted 
content,
81
 which is a pervasive problem that persists in developing 
countries.
82
 Among the main criticisms of the Appendix are its bureaucratic 
rules, its limited scope, and its excessive safeguards in favor of right 
                                                                                                                                                   
are inapplicable and unnecessary). But see Bassem AWAD, Moatasem EL-GHERIANI and 
Perihan ABOU ZEID, Egypt, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 61, at 49 (supporting, in an 
analogous case, the efficacy of the Egyptian mechanism of compulsory licensing, in spite 
of its compliance with omission of international commitments). The legal reasoning of the 
captured Colombian copyright authority is improper, because it subordinates efficacy of 
legislative measures to diligence of administrative officers in comply with international 
requirements; the compulsory license provided into domestic law is still valid, without 
prejudice of the possible international responsibility that the neglected omission of 
administrative authority may create for the country. In this case, this s prevented by the fact 
that the same authority omitted the self-availing requirement, supports the inapplicability of 
the compulsory license, and, plus, is the one in charge of issuing those license, in case.  
76
 See RENGIFO GARCÍA, supra note 72, at 178 (stating that the provisions that 
implement the Appendix of the Berne Convention into the Colombian domestic law lack 
any actual application).  
77
 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1705.6, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (providing that state parties cannot issue these compulsory 
licenses when its need “could be met by the right holder's voluntary actions but for 
obstacles created by the party's measures”). 
78
 See SERRANO MIGALLÓN, supra note 74, at 161 (stating that the compulsory 
licensing mechanism based on public interest has been available “since the first 
codification of the independent Mexico”). 
79
 Telephone Interview with Marco A. Morales Montes, Legal Director, Instituto 
Nacional del Derecho de Autor (Mexico) (Apr. 4, 2011). 
80
 Id. 
81
 See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 77. 
82
 See Margaret Chon, Copyright and capability for education: an approach „from 
below‟, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT TRENDS AND 
FUTURE SCENARIOS 218, 218-49 (Tzen Wong and Graham Dutfield, eds., 2011), (referring 
the severe shortage of textbook in developing countries and arguing in favor of reforming 
the compulsory licensing system provided by the Appendix of the Berne Convention). 
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holders.
83
 Instead of being an instrument for development, the Appendix 
has reduced the ability of developing countries to design public policies to 
enable a wide dissemination of knowledge. As a result, countries have 
implemented idiosyncratic flexibilities into their domestic law. 
B. Developing Countries Are Doing It Their Own Way 
Countries have adopted a wide range of alternative solutions into their 
domestic law in order to mitigate the limitations and uselessness of the 
Appendix mechanism. Some of these solutions reach beyond the 
Convention’s foresight. Some are based on copyright exceptions that may 
or may not comply with the Berne three-step test. In other cases, countries 
have adopted a mechanism of compulsory licensing much broader or more 
flexible than the Appendix. For instance, some countries allow licenses to 
prevent monopolies for the public interest. Several countries have a pool of 
mechanisms to allow access to copyrighted works for purposes of 
development. Some of these include copyright exceptions, a diversity of 
compulsory licenses, and even expropriation. A few countries have 
implemented a more radical measure whereby protected works that have not 
been translated enter into the public domain, legitimating the use of works 
by others.  
Copyright exceptions and limitations are the main strategy developing 
countries seem to have adopted to meet their needs.  In Chile, for example, 
a recent amendment to the copyright act includes three specific exceptions 
for translation:
84
 personal use,
85
 educational purposes,
86
 and library 
patrons.
87
 However, the requirements of the Berne three-step test forces 
exceptions provided by countries like Chile to remain too narrow to meet 
the intended purposes of the Appendix provisions.
88
 As a result, those 
                                                          
83
 See generally Salah Basalamah, Compulsory Licensing for Translation: An 
Instrument of Development?, 40 IDEA 503 (2000) (reviewing critically the main provisions 
of the Appendix).  
84
 See Law No.20.435, mayo 4, 2010, Diario Oficial [D.O.], (Chile); see also Daniel 
Alvarez, The Quest for a Normative Balance: The Recent Reforms to Chile‟s Copyright 
Law, Policy Brief No. 12, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
(2011) (briefly describing the whole legal reform). 
85
 See id., art. 71 R (authorizing the translation of work in foreign languages for 
personal use). 
86
 See id., art. 71 M (authorizing non-for profit translation of small fragments of works 
for including them into text books).  
87
 See id., art. 71 L (authorizing non-for profit libraries and archives to translate works 
into Spanish for researching purposes of their patrons, including its reproduction in 
quotations). 
88
 In the case of Chile, during the legislative discussion of the amendment to the 
intellectual property act, a proposal was introduced to provide a compulsory licensing 
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exceptions satisfy highly limited purposes as they are usually subject to 
several conditions. For instance, there may be limitations on the quantity 
and quality of use based on the type of work and/or user; restrictions based 
on where work may be located and the circumstances in which the works 
may be used. As a result, using copyright exceptions and limitations alone 
is very limiting for developing countries in their quest for satisfying their 
development needs. 
Some countries have adopted broader copyright exceptions and 
limitations that allow the translation and publication from one language to 
another. Whether this type of provisions comply with the Berne three-step 
test is a matter of debate. For example, China recently adopted a new 
copyright law that sets forth several provisions regarding translation.
89
 One 
exception allows the translation and reproduction of brief excerpts for 
research and teaching.
90
 A compulsory license allows using a work in 
textbooks.
91
 Additionally, another exception allows the translations of 
Chinese authors’ works from Han into the languages of minorities within 
the country.
92
 The latter exception may infringe on the three-step test 
because it allows the translation of works without compensation to right 
holders. But the application of this exception is severely limited by the 
nationality of the author, the source and the target languages. Although 
these circumstances mitigate international conflicts that may arise from 
                                                                                                                                                   
system similar to the Appendix, but it did not prosper because its adoption would require 
compliance with legal procedures related to the legislative process. 
89
 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China] as amended on Feb. 26, 2010 
(People’s Republic of China); see also, HONG XUE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN 
CHINA 30 (2010). 
90
 See [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China], as amended on Feb. 26, 
2010 (People’s Republic of China), art. 22 (6) (authorizing translation, or reproduction in a 
small quantity of copies of a published work by teachers or scientific researchers for use in 
classroom teaching or scientific research, if works are not published for distribution); see 
also, Decree No. 468 Regulations on Protection of the Right of Communication through 
Information Network (adopted by the State Council, May 10, 2006)(China) art. 6.3 
(making the exception available also for using a work on digital environments).  
91
 See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 23 as amended on Feb. 26, 
2010 (People’s Republic of China)(authorizing compilation of passages from a work and 
short written works, among others, for textbooks for compulsory and national education, 
under payment and excepting works whose authors have rejected in advance that use); see 
also, Decree No. 468 Regulations on Protection of the Right of Communication through 
Information Network art. 8 (adopted by the State Council, May 10, 2006)(China) 
(providing similar authorization for e-learning). 
92
 See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, as amended on Feb. 26, 2010 
art. 22 (11) (People’s Republic of China); see also, Decree No. 468 Regulations on 
Protection of the Right of Communication through Information Network (adopted by the 
State Council, May 10, 2006) art. 6.5 (China) (providing analogous exception for digital 
environments). 
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China’s violation of the three-step test, they also, prevent the exception 
from achieving the Appendix goals with respect to foreign authors and 
languages. 
In addition to exceptions, some countries have adopted compulsory 
licensing schemes that are more permissive than the Appendix. As 
mentioned above, this is the case of the United Arab Emirates.
93
 This also 
seems to be the case of South Africa.
94
 In its copyright law, South Africa 
expressly included the translation of works when it authorizes any other 
exception, instead of adopting a case-by-case exception for translation.
95
 
The law also confers competence to the South African Copyright Tribunal 
to issue a compulsory license when a right holder has unreasonably refused 
to do so.
96
 Additionally, the law allows the government to adopt regulations 
on circulation, presentation or exhibition of works, which scholars have 
argued would allow possible “non-voluntary licence schemes”.97 
Some countries have adopted a general compulsory license regime into 
their domestic laws that allows compulsory licenses on public interest 
grounds. This is the case of Sudan,
98
 Syria,
99
 and Bolivia. The latter, for 
instance, has adopted copyright exceptions and limitations in its domestic 
and Andean Community laws.
100
 Although Bolivia has not implemented the 
Appendix mechanism, its copyright act authorizes compulsory licenses for 
                                                          
93
 See Federal Law No. 7 of the Year 2002 Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring 
Rights art. 21  (United Arabs Emirates) (setting for a soft-regulated compulsory license for 
translation and/or reproduction of works). 
94
 See Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002 (S. Afr.); see also, Tobias 
Schonwetter, Caroline Ncube and Pria Chetty, South Africa, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra 
note 61, at 243. 
95
 Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002, § 12 (11) (S. Afr.) (adopting an 
exception for translation that embraces several other exceptions also set forth by law). 
96
 Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002, §§ 29 – 36 (S. Afr.). 
97
 Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended in 2002, § 45 (S. Afr.); see, Tobias 
Schonwetter, Caroline Ncube and Pria Chetty, South Africa, in ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra 
note 61, at 243. 
98
 See Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996 (Sudan), § 14, 20(1) 
(setting forth several limited exceptions, essentially for reproduction, including one for 
translation for personal and private use and providing a compulsory license, according to 
which, in case of public interest, government may require right holder publication of a 
work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation). 
99
 See Copyright Law of Syria, Law No. 12/2001 §§ 21, 37 of 27 Feb. 2001 (setting 
forth several exceptions that allow the reproduction of works in its source language or its 
translation, including some for educational and research purposes and adopting a 
compulsory license; in case of public interest, government may require right holder 
publication of a work, under sanction of order its publication with compensation).  
100
 See Law No. 1322 art. 24, Apr. 27, 1992, Gaceta Oficial (Bolivia) (adopting 
copyright exceptions and limitation in domestic law); see also Andean Community 
Decision 351 Common Regime on Copyright and Neighboring Rights arts. 21, 22, 24-27, 
Dec. 21, 1993, Official Gazette of the Andean Community No.145 (adopting several 
mandatory copyright exceptions and limitations for Andean Community members). 
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the use of a copyrighted work on public interest grounds subject to a royalty 
payment.
101
 There is no evidence, however, that the government has issued 
any of these licenses. Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which that 
provision of Bolivian domestic law prevails over the common copyright 
regime of the Andean Community,
102
 to which Bolivia is party.
103
 
Adopting the Appendix mechanism and a general compulsory license 
based on public interest grounds is a common strategy among some 
countries. For example, the Dominican Republic
104
 and Jordan.
105
 The 
copyright law of the Dominican Republic sets forth not only copyright 
exceptions and compulsory licensing inspired by the Appendix; it also 
establishes a general compulsory license.
106
 According to Jordan’s 
copyright law, the government may issue a compulsory license for using a 
work on public interest grounds and subject to a royalty payment. It is 
unclear, however, to what extent the overlap between public interest 
compulsory licenses and the Appendix mechanism deprives the latter of 
significance. If a country offers both compulsory licenses, there is no reason 
to use the Appendix provision because the public interest option achieves 
similar results with less paperwork and fewer requirements. 
Several countries have gone even further to meet their development 
needs, by implementing a public interest “compulsory license” with no 
compensation for affected right holders. Cuba, for example, has notified 
WIPO to use the Appendix mechanism. Instead of implementing it, 
however, Cuba has adopted a real copyright exception with the same 
                                                          
101
 See Law No. 1322 art. 25, Apr. 27, 1992, Gaceta Oficial (Bolivia)  (authorizing the 
government to decree the use for public need of economic rights on a work of great cultural 
value for the country, or social or public interest, under previous fair compensation to its 
right holder).  
102
 Common Regime on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Decision No. 351, Andean 
Community (Dec. 17, 1993), 145 Official Gazette of the Andean Community, art. 32 
(prescribing that, in any case, compulsory licenses set forth in domestic law of Andean 
Community members can exceed limitations allowed by the Berne Convention or the 
Universal Copyright Convention). 
103
 Acuerdo de Cartagena [Cartagena Agreement], May 28, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (creating 
the Andean Community, which currently is formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Peru).  
104
 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
105
 See supra notes 55 and 56, and accompanying text. 
106
 See L. No. 65-00 de Derecho de Autor [Copyright Act], art. 48, agosto 24, 2000, 
Diario Oficial (Dom. Rep.) (authorizing the government to decree the use for public need 
of economic rights on a work of great cultural, scientific, or educational value for the 
country, or social or public interest, under previous fair compensation to its right holder); 
see also Decreto N° 362-01 que establece el reglamento de aplicación de la Ley N° 65-00 
sobre Derecho de Autor [Decree on Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Act], 
marzo 14, 2001  (Dom. Rep.), arts. 25 – 28 (regulating the requirements and procedures for 
issuing a public interest compulsory license). 
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purposes and safeguards of the Appendix mechanism, except for 
remuneration of right holders.
107
 On the one hand, Cuban scholars and 
experts assure that the mechanism has been used primarily to overcome the 
U.S. embargo and has allowed an important number of translations, 
particularly in the fields of medicine and sciences.
108
 On the other hand, 
critics of the Cuban solution have questioned its compliance with 
international standards.
109
 An analogous mechanism is available in 
Vietnam’s copyright law. There, the government can adopt restrictions, on 
exclusive rights, including compulsory licensing, without mention of any 
compensation.
110
 Curiously, both Cuba and Vietnam have notified WIPO in 
order to use the Appendix mechanism, which raises concerns about the 
proper understanding that those countries have about the Appendix 
mechanism. In other words, those countries that have implemented the 
Appendix mechanism into their domestic laws hardly comply with any of 
its internationally sanctioned standards, procedures, and requirements. 
Some countries have adopted the extinction of copyright protection of 
works that are not translated into domestic languages as another measure to 
meet their development needs. For instance, Egypt and Kuwait have 
adopted this mechanism.
111
 In the Egyptian case, the law has set forth a 
compulsory licensing system that follows the Appendix philosophy in a 
                                                          
107
 See, supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
108
 Interview with Lillian Alvarez, Scholar and Legal Adviser on Copyright, (Cuba) 
(Jun. 28, 2010); see also, Julio Fernández Bulté, Preface to Lillian Alvarez, El Derecho de 
¿Autor?: El Debate de Hoy vii-xvi (2006) (recalling the decision of the Cuban government 
to use compulsory licenses for overcoming the book shortage created by the American 
blockage to the island). 
109
 See Caridad del Carmen Valdés Diaz, La Facultad de Reproducción, in SELECCIÓN 
DE LECTURAS DE DERECHO DE AUTOR 65, 105 (Marta Moreno Cruz et al., 2000) (arguing 
that this exception exceeds the standards generally admitted on copyright and it is in 
disharmony with the Berne Convention, and reporting the challenge of the WIPO to that 
provision). 
110
 See Intellectual Property Law No. 50/2005/QH11, Nov. 29, 2005 (Viet.), art. 7.3 
(setting forth that government may prohibit or restrict exercise the exercise of rights or 
compel its licensing for guaranteeing “achievement of defense, security, people’s life-
related objectives and other interests of the State and society”). 
111
 See Law No. 64 of 1999 concerning Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 29, 1999 
(Kuwait), arts. 14, 16.1-2 (setting forth a compulsory license for the publication and 
republication of works by Kuwaiti authorship, providing copyright lapsing if translation 
into Arabic is not made available within five years of the date of first publication, and 
adopting a compulsory license for translating works before its possible copyright lapsing). 
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more simplified way.
112
 The law has also established that copyright 
protection of works not translated into Arabic lapses after three years of the 
date of first publication.
113
 If this is the case, the work enters into the public 
domain. At this point, interested parties can pay a fee for a license that 
allows the commercial and professional exploitation of the work.
114
 
Therefore, in theory, a compulsory license similar to the Appendix may be 
requested for translating works within three years of their publication; after 
that period, a public-domain license may be requested for translating works 
that have not been timely translated into Arabic.
115
 Some scholars have 
raised a concern about this regulation’s consistency with international law; 
however, the efficacy of the mechanism also has been contested, since it is 
almost unknown among domestic publishers and, in addition, the main 
public initiatives that translate works into Arabic do not rely on compulsory 
but voluntary licensing.
116
 
The significant number of developing countries that have adopted 
idiosyncratic legal mechanisms for granting broader access to copyrighted 
works also suggests the inefficacy of the Appendix. This is not a desirable 
outcome for at least three reasons. First, it is unclear whether any of these 
idiosyncratic solutions is in compliance with international copyright 
instruments. This situation creates a risk of conflict before the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Second, precisely because of the risk of international 
                                                          
112
 Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 82 of 2002, Official Gazette, 
Jun. 2, 2002 (Egypt), art. 170 (adopting a brief regulation for like-the-Appendix 
compulsory licensing) However, Egypt has not renewed its own self-availed notice to the 
WIPO Secretariat, the last of them was done in 1990 and was valid up to 1994. See also, 
Prime Minister Decree No. 497 of 2005 on Issuing the Executive Regulations for Book III 
Of Law No. (82) of 2002 on The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (complementing 
the law on compulsory licensing for translation and reproduction of works). 
113
 See Law No. 82 of 2002 (Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Copyrights and 
Neighbouring Rights), Official Gazette, Jun. 2, 2002, art. 148, (Egypt) (providing 
“copyright… shall lapse with regards to the translation of that work into the Arabic 
language, unless the author or the translator himself exercises this right directly or 
through a third party within three years of the date of first publication of the original or 
translated work”); see Ahmed Abdel Latif, Egypt‟s Role in the A2K Movement: An 
Analysis of Positions and Policies, in, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN EGYPT: NEW RESEARCH 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 16, 39 (Nagla Rizk & Lea 
Shaver, eds. 2012).  
114
 See Law No. 82 of 2002 (Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Copyrights and 
Neighbouring Rights), Official Gazette, Jun. 2, 2002, art. 183 (Egypt) (requiring 
governmental license for commercial or professional exploitation of work, against payment 
of fees). 
115
 See Hossam A. El Saghir, Intellectual Property Law in Egypt, in 53 International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws 3, 45-46, 65 (2009). 
116
 See Bassem Awad, Moatasem El-Gheriani and Perihan Abou Zeid, Egypt, in 
ARMSTRONG ET AL., supra note 61, at 22, 49. 
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conflict, domestic authorities are discouraged from actually implementing 
those mechanisms. It appears as if both authorities and potential users are 
reluctant to take advantage of these mechanisms. Third, sui generis features 
of domestic solutions impair the emergence of uniform international 
standards and practices of both the publishing and educational sectors. More 
significantly, the variety of domestic provisions defeats the purpose of 
providing an effective solution for developing countries to ensure wider 
dissemination of knowledge. 
In sum, the Appendix mechanism seems to provide a partial 
solution to less than a handful of developing countries that 
have notified WIPO’s General Director of their intention to 
use of the mechanism. Significantly, no evidence of actual 
use has been found. Several other countries have not 
notified WIPO of their adoption of the mechanism because 
it has proven to be useless, while others have adopted 
idiosyncratic solutions into their domestic law. In general, 
data suggest that the Appendix of the Berne Convention 
has failed to meet the needs of developing countries. 
C. The Appendix Does Not Provide a Solution for Minorities 
It is unclear whether the provisions of the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention apply to the languages of cultural minorities in developing 
countries. The Appendix authorizes compulsory licenses to translate works 
to languages in general use in the country that issues a license. Although the 
Appendix encompasses more than a country’s official languages, it does not 
define what is a language in general use.
117
 For example, between 2005 and 
2009, according to the ISBN register, only 323 books were published in 14 
native languages in all of Ibero-America (i.e., Latin America, Portugal, and 
Spain).
118
 In contrast, there are 64 native languages and several dialects in 
Colombia alone.
119
 Clearly, the registered amount of publications cannot 
satisfy the needs of native communities. A new instrument that provides an 
adequate mechanism to meet the needs of developing countries must be 
expressly more flexible regarding the languages to which a work can be 
                                                          
117
 See WIPO Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention Paris, 
Jul. 5-24, 1971, General Report of Paris Conference, ¶ 34 (providing an authoritative 
interpretation of this requirement, by stating that a language could be one of general use in 
a given geographic region of the country, an ethnic group, and even a language generally 
use for particular purposes).  
118
 See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 62 (stating that 323 books 
were published between 2005 and 2009 in a native language, of them: 82,4% in Guarani; 
4,3% in Quechua; and, 4,0% in Aymara).  
119
 See id., at 76. 
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translated. In particular, the new instrument should allow the translation of 
works into languages that are not in general use.  
Access to copyrighted works for language minorities is an urgent issue in 
both developing and developed countries.
120
 In Spain, for example, along 
with “Castilian” (the officially adopted regional language of Castile 
commonly known as Spanish), there are several other regional languages in 
use. Aranese, Basque, Catalan, Galician, and Valencian, among others were 
all banned during the long Franco dictatorship.
121
 The communities that 
currently speak those languages cannot take advantage of the Appendix, 
because they are located in a developed country.
122
 This is also an issue for 
the Navajo and Hawaiian populations of the United States, the Ladin and 
Slovene communities of Italy, the Inuit in Canada, and so on. Linguistic 
minorities in developed countries face serious challenges that mirror those 
faced by similar minorities in developing countries. This situation illustrates 
that the Appendix wrongly assumes that (1) development is homogeneous 
within the borders of a given country and (2) there are no special needs to 
be met in developed countries. 
When copyright blocks the translation of works into a minority language, 
its native speakers are forced to adopt a more generally used language, 
possibly condemning the minority language to extinction.
123
 This situation 
raises concerns regarding minorities’ right to identity, and protection of 
their cultural diversity. The Appendix has provided developing countries 
with flexibilities that facilitate their population’s access to works to improve 
social, economic, and cultural conditions. However, the Appendix does not 
provide analogous flexibilities for disadvantages communities within 
developed countries. If these communities face similar challenges, the 
Appendix should not be an obstacle for adopting an analogous solution. 
                                                          
120
 See Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention 1973, supra note 33, ¶ 22 
(reporting that Canada expressed similar concerns about the relativity of the concept of 
developed and developing countries). 
121
 See JOSEP BENET, CATALUNYA SOTA EL RÈGIM FRANQUISTA: INFORME SOBRE LA 
PERSECUCIÓ DE LA LLENGUA I LA CULTURA DE CATALUNYA PEL RÈGIM DEL GENERAL 
FRANCO (1978); and, JOSEP BENET, L' INTENT FRANQUISTA DE GENOCIDI CULTURAL 
CONTRA CATALUNYA (1995) (referring to the proscription of the Catalan language from the 
public space in favor of the Castilian during Franco’s dictatorship, and its effects on the 
language, the culture, and the identity of Catalan people).  
122
 In 2009, 78.32% of the publications done in Spain were in Castilian; 9.55% in 
Catalan; 1.92% in Galician; 1.85% in Basque; 1.27% in Valencian; and 0.1% in other 
Spanish languages; see Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 60-61. 
123
 See Peter Austin and Andrew Simpson, Introduction, in Endangered Languages 5 
(Peter Austin and Andrew Simpson eds., 2007) (reporting several studies that 
conservatively foresee at least the lost of 50% of language diversity in next century, a 
process that affects particularly Australia and the Americas). 
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Otherwise, the Appendix creates disadvantages for the very development of 
those communities. In other terms, the Appendix must adopt a 
comprehensive approach to development, not limited to developing 
countries, but to any community that requires copyright flexibility for 
meeting the needs of its members, being part of a developing or a developed 
country. 
According to the recently adopted Convention on Cultural Diversity,
124
 
governments must protect and promote cultural diversity, including 
linguistic diversity as an essential component of the former. This 
convention does not have established any copyright requirements.  Instead, 
the convention recognizes the importance of intellectual property to 
encourage the participation in cultural creativity.
125
 Copyrights are 
essentially “private rights”,126 while cultural diversity is humankind’s 
common heritage to be cherished and preserved for the benefit of all.
127
 
Therefore, if copyrights and cultural diversity were to come into conflict, 
cultural diversity arguably prevails over copyright. 
Any new attempts to infuse the international copyright 
regime with flexibilities must be consistent with 
governmental obligations to protect and promote cultural 
diversity. Consequently, the Appendix must reconsider 
whether language access is only an issue for developing 
countries or a broader issue that also involves developed 
countries. This may become an urgent matter in coming 
years as a globalized environment accelerates the loss of 
cultural and linguistic diversity. 
D. The Appendix‟s Application to Digital Works Is Unclear 
At the time the Appendix was adopted, the Internet and digitalization of 
content were not a reality, at least not in its current proportions. Today, by 
contrast, according to the International Telecommunication Union, there are 
                                                          
124
 UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005, Records of the General Conference 83 [hereinafter Convention 
for Cultural Diversity]. 
125
  See Thierry Desurmont, Considerations on the Relationship between the 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and 
the Protection of Authors' Rights, 208 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 2 
(2006). 
126
 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, Preamble (“recognizing that intellectual 
property rights are private rights”). 
127
 See Convention for Cultural Diversity, supra note 124, Preamble (recognizing “that 
cultural diversity forms a common heritage of humanity and should be cherished and 
preserved for the benefit of all”). 
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around two billion users around the world: thirty percent of the global 
population.
128
 Technology allows the expeditious and inexpensive 
production and distribution of content. Ironically, digital content is 
asymmetrically available throughout the world, with people in developed 
countries having more access than people in developing countries. Although 
content can be produced at a low cost, technology itself remains expensive, 
particularly for developing countries. As a result, some developing 
countries have not prioritized their Internet-related public policies, even 
when these could increase access to knowledge. For these governments, 
Internet policy is an objective for the distant future. However, as the cost of 
technology decreases, people from less developed countries will likely 
enjoy the benefits of technological advances.   Hence, the question arises: 
Does the Appendix mechanism of compulsory licensing apply to the online 
environment? 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention may suggest that it does not 
provide a legal framework of flexibilities respect to digital works. The 
provisions of the Appendix expressly limit their application to the non-
digital environment, as they expressly allow the translation and 
reproduction of a given work “in printed or analogous forms of 
reproduction.”129 This clause suggests that digital forms of reproduction are 
excluded from the scope of the Appendix. This exclusion may explain why 
some Appendix provisions have a strong territorial character and seem 
inappropriate for digital environments. For instance, the requirement that 
nationals of the country issuing a license must do the translation;
130
 the ban 
on exports;
131
 the hypothesis of “out of print” editions;132 the exhaustion of 
stock;
133
 and in situ sales.
134
 
Nevertheless, the Appendix provisions are fully operational in online 
                                                          
128
 See Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service 
Sector, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom.html (last visited: May 15, 2011).  
129
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. II (1), II (2) (a), & III.7. 
130
 See id. Appendix, arts. IV (4 (a) and IV (5) (assuming that translation services would 
be provided in situ within the same country that issues and takes advantages of the 
compulsory licenses). 
131
 See id.  Appendix, art. IV (4) (a) (excluding exporting would make no sense on 
digital environment).  
132
 See id. Appendix, art. II (2) (b) (excluding digital copies of a work, since they would 
be out of print hardly, because of their easy reproduction). 
133
 See id. Appendix, art. II (6) (excluding digital copies because the provisions would 
assume there is a physical stock susceptible of being exhausted, which would seem 
inconceivable in case of digital copies). 
134
 See id.  Appendix, art. III (2) (a) (excluding online sales, by requiring they have 
place in the country). 
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environments.
135
 Neither the Convention nor any other subsequent 
international instruments on copyright, such as the TRIPS Agreement 
(1994) or the WIPO Internet Treaties (1996), has excluded the application 
of the Appendix to digital works and online environment. Moreover, the 
terms and provisions of the Appendix have a technologically neutral 
meaning. In other words, the Annex provisions refer to processes, such as 
translation and reproduction, rather than to a specific technology. Although 
the Appendix does include some limitations, these are not intended to 
exclude the online environment from the scope of the Appendix. Rather, 
these limitations sought to ensure that the Appendix flexibilities favor only 
developing countries. Several of these flexibilities set forth territorial or 
availability limitations that can be preserved through the use of technology. 
Therefore, when properly analyzed, the Appendix allows developing 
countries to take advantage of its provisions both on and off-line. 
WIPO documents confirm that the Appendix may apply to online 
environments and that developing countries may, therefore, make use of 
digital technologies to implement its provisions. According to WIPO 
Guidelines, the phrase “in printed or analogous forms of reproduction” 
means that the mechanism applies to “similar” works, such as books and 
printed materials, as opposed to films and records.
136
 Another clause of the 
Appendix ratifies this interpretation when it unequivocally distinguishes 
between “in printed or analogous forms of reproduction” and “audio-visual 
forms.”137 Finally, interpreting the Appendix in light of its goals and 
purposes and in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,
138
 the WIPO Guidelines state that what is ultimately important is 
“the purpose of the translation, namely teaching, scholarship and 
research”.139 This statement suggests that as long as the use of the work 
achieves the intended purpose, the form of the work becomes irrelevant. 
For international copyright scholars, whether the Appendix provisions 
apply to the online environment is a matter of debate. For authors writing at 
the time of the Appendix approval, its application to the digital environment 
                                                          
135
 See FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 21-22 (stating that compulsory licenses for 
translation and/or reproduction set forth by the Appendix apply to “any work able of being 
printed”, and suggesting that it may apply to digital networks, if works were able of being 
controlled as the Appendix requires). 
136
 See WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at 153.  
137
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. III (7); see also, WIPO Guide, 
supra note 14, at 165. 
138
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (recognizing the teleological interpretation of a treaty, thus is, “in the 
light of its object and purpose”).  
139
 WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at 153. 
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was not even a topic in discussion.
140
 However, for a majority of scholars 
the clause “in printed or analogous forms of reproduction” did not intend 
to exclude digital formats. Rather, the phrase sought to allow the translation 
and reproduction of any written work as opposed to recordings.
141
 A 
competing interpretation of the Appendix provisions arose later, during the 
1980s, claiming that the Appendix provisions prevent the translation and 
reproduction of works in digital format.
142
 According to this odd 
interpretation, the word “analogous” means “the opposite of digital,” a 
meaning hardly plausible to the Appendix drafters in 1971.
143
 Moreover, the 
                                                          
140
 See e.g., DELIA LIPSZYC, LA CONFERENCIA DE REVISIÓN DE LAS CONVENCIONES DE 
BERNA Y UNIVERSAL (PARIS – JULIO DE 1971): ENFOQUE ARGENTINO (1975).  
141
 See Ulmer, supra note 24,  at 360, 369 (explaining that the purpose of the Appendix 
is prohibiting translation by means of recordings); S. M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 164, 171 (1983) (stating that the purpose of the 
Appendix is facilitate the translation of works, but not records and performances); 
NORDEMANN, VINCK, HERTIN & MEYER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING 
RIGHTS LAW: COMMENTARY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 302 
(1990) (stating that the reproduction refers to any printing process, because the decisive 
point is that the work is visually perceivable); DESBOIS, FRANÇON, & KÉRÉVER, LES 
CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DES DROITS VOISINS 295-297 
(1976) (explaining that the wording of the Appendix attempts to exclude phonograms and 
films from compulsory licensing); see also, Henri Desbois, La Conférence Diplomatique 
de Révision des Conventions de Berne et de Genève, in 68 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU 
DROIT D’AUTEUR 3 , 38-39 (1991).  
142
 See RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 638 (stating without foundations that compulsory 
licenses set forth in the Appendix do not apply to works embodied in a computer data 
base); SAM RICKETSON, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS, STUDY ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN 
THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 33 (2003), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf (suggesting that the 
compulsory licensing adopted by the Appendix of the Berne Convention does not apply to 
digital environment, but omitting again any reasoning supporting that suggestion); and, 
Sam RICKETSON and Jane C. GINSBURG, supra note 22, at 930 (saying compulsory licenses 
exclude works embodied in electronic form); see also, MIHÁLY FICSOR, Copyright and 
Transfer of Knowledge, in 17 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULLETIN 6, 15 (1983) (suggesting 
that the rules of the Appendix do not apply to computer technologies, but supporting the 
need to extend them to new uses that serve the same purpose). But see, MIHÁLY FICSOR, 
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR 
INTERPRETATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION 278-280 (2002) (mitigating its initial suggestion 
by admitting some narrow application of the Appendix provisions on digital networks); see 
also, MIHÁLY FICSOR, LIMITACIONES Y EXCEPCIONES AL DERECHO DE AUTOR EN EL 
ENTORNO DIGITAL, 32-33 (2008) (supporting his latter interpretation of the Appendix 
provisions). 
143
 Those who argue the Appendix of the Berne Convention does not allow translation 
and reproduction of works in digital form relay heavily in the meaning of the word 
“analogous” as the opposite of digital. This meaning is misleading because: i) the 
Convention uses the word “analogous” in several other provisions with the purpose of 
allowing an extensive interpretation, no to exclude digital technologies; ii) in English, 
French and Spanish the first sense of the word analogous is similar, likely, or comparable; 
in fact, the usage of analogous as opposite of digital or computer technologies has not been 
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texts and reports of the Appendix of the Berne Convention and the 
Universal Copyright Convention do not support this interpretation.
144
 
Unfortunately, that foundationless restrictive interpretation has prevailed 
among scholars,
145
 even among those who support the inclusion flexibilities 
for purposes of development.
146
 As a result, there is a deeply rooted 
mistaken belief that the Appendix provisions do not apply to either digital 
works or the online environment. 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention allows compulsory licenses for 
translation and/or reproduction of foreign digital works into languages of 
general use in developing countries. Its provisions do not prohibit licensing 
digital works, as that would defeat the very purposes of the Appendix.  
However, the Appendix would be a clearer and more useful legal 
                                                                                                                                                   
approved yet, at least by the Spanish Real Academy; iii) the dichotomy between analogous 
and digital took place only in the eighties, precisely when the restrictive interpretation of 
the provisions of the Appendix came up.  
144
 As a matter of fact, the General Report of Paris Conference does neither support the 
exclusion of digital works nor provide an explanation of the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention in this point. Instead, the Report of the General Repporteur of the Universal 
Copyright Convention analyzes its analogous provisions extensively. It explains that 
translation and reproduction refer to writings but exclude “sound recordings and any other 
form except one from which it can be read or other wise visually perceived.” Compare  
General Report of Paris Conference 1971, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 27 – 43, with Revision of 
the Universal Copyright Convention 1973, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 87 and 112.  
145
 See, e.g., Juan Carlos Monroy Rodríguez, Necesidad de Nuevas Limitaciones o 
Excepciones para Facilitar la Digitalización y Puesta a Disposición de Obras Protegidas 
en el Marco de la Educación Virtual, 14 REVISTA LA PROPIEDAD INMATERIAL 195 (2010) 
(suggesting that international instruments on copyright are limited to the non digital 
environment); JUAN CARLOS MONROY RODRÍGUEZ, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, STUDY ON THE LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH 
ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 48-49 & 237 (2009) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130303  (excluding any 
applicability of the Appendix to works published in digital format and supporting his 
statement on Mihály Ficsor); see also, DANIEL SENG, WIPO STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, STUDY ON THE COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR ASIA AND AUSTRALIA 16, 18 (2009), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=130249 (stating that the 
Appendix does not apply to recordings nor works in electronic form based on Sam 
Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg’s work); RICARDO ANTEQUERA, LAS LIMITACIONES Y 
EXCEPCIONES AL DERECHO DE AUTOR Y LOS DERECHOS CONEXOS EN EL ENTORNO 
DIGITAL, WIPO Document (2005), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/lac/es/ompi_sgae_da_asu_05/ompi_sgae_da_asu_05_2.p
df (omitting any mention to the Appendix of the Berne Convention and similar compulsory 
licenses in his analysis of exceptions and limitations applicable to the digital environment).   
146
 See e.g., FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 21, 22 (expressing doubts whether the 
provisions of the Appendix apply to digital works); see also, CLAUDE COLOMBET, 
GRANDES PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO DE AUTOR Y LOS DERECHOS CONEXOS EN EL MUNDO: 
ESTUDIO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 180 (1997) (suggesting doubts by expressing that 
several technologies have not been handled by the Berne Convention, including those 
related with information technology). 
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instrument if it unequivocally stated its full applicability to digital works 
and online environment to allow developing countries to take advantage of 
available technologies for a wider dissemination of knowledge.
147
  
 
IV. A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENT IS NECESSARY TO MEET 
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS 
As mentioned above, developing countries are not using the Appendix 
mechanism due to its bureaucratic requirements, limited advantages, and 
high transactional cost, among others. Moreover, the application of the 
Appendix in digital works and online environments is debatable, and it is 
also elusive for protecting linguistic minorities. The fact that the Appendix 
does not meet the needs of developing countries is by itself enough to 
justify a new and more effective instrument. This section, however, presents 
two additional arguments in favor of adopting a new Appendix for the 
Berne Convention. First, developed countries should provide proper 
flexibilities to developing countries for general welfare policy. Second, 
authors and right holders should consider the opportunities offered by an 
adequate international arrangement. 
A. Adopting Flexibilities to Advance Enforcement 
Most international instruments on intellectual property have focused on 
harmonizing the protection for right holders through substantive minimal 
legal standards. The Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and even the 
WIPO Internet Treaties have forced some uniformity onto aspects such as 
the range of exclusive rights granted to authors, the term of protection, the 
requirements for limitations and exceptions, among others. The actual 
enforcement of these internationally harmonized rights, however, has been 
left mainly to domestic law. 
In recent years, developed countries have emphasized the need for an 
international regime for the effective enforcement of intellectual 
                                                          
147
 But see, Law No. 22 of 1992 on the Protection of Copyright and its Amendments 
(Jordan), as amended by the Amending Law No. 9 of 2005, art. 11 (setting forth an 
Appendix-like compulsory license for translating and/or publishing “in a printed form or 
any other form” to the Arabic language); Decree No. 468 Regulations on Protection of the 
Right of Communication through Information Network (adopted by the State Council, May 
10, 2006), (China) (providing compulsory licensing for translation and use of work on 
digital environment, but only respect to works by national authors). 
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property.
148
 The European Union has agreed to a unified standard of 
intellectual property enforcement within its Internal Market.
149
 The United 
States also has included standards of enforcement in its bilateral 
negotiations, particularly in all free trade agreements entered in the last 
decade.
150
 Both the European Union and the United States, together with 
other developed economies, recently attempted to converge on an 
international instrument for enforcing intellectual property, the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.
151
 The United States is also negotiating 
similar provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, an initiative 
that deepens free trade within the Pacific rim.
152
 The enforcement of 
intellectual property, therefore, is a well-established issue in the 
international agenda of developed countries. 
Developing countries, in contrast, have expressed different concerns. 
Focusing on intellectual property enforcement is not only counterproductive 
vis-à-vis their comparatively weaker economies; it also raises public policy 
and human rights concerns. As a result, developing countries have 
supported their own “Development Agenda” to obtain the flexibility that is 
currently lacking in the existing international legal framework. In this 
context, for example, proposals for treaties on the protection of traditional 
knowledge, copyright access for people with disabilities, and copyright 
exceptions for educational purposes have been introduced before the 
WIPO.
153
 Developing countries have raised their voice to draw attention to 
                                                          
148
 See e.g., G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration Toyako Declaration on 
World Economy, July 8, 2008, ¶ 17, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/doc080714__en.html (last 
visited: Mar. 27, 2012) (encouraging the negotiations of an international instrument for 
enforcing intellectual property; G8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
United Kingdom, and United States). 
149
 See Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 47 (adopting a 
harmonizing regulation for intellectual property enforcement within the European Union). 
150
 The United States has included similar provisions in FTAs with Singapore, Chile, 
Morocco, Australia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Dominican Republic, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Korea. See Free Trade 
Agreements, U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements (last visited May 15, 2011). 
151
 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, preamble, Dec. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf 
152
 See Trans-Pacific Partnership – Intellectual Property Rights Chapter: Draft – Feb. 
10, 2011 (unofficial leaked version), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-
10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf 
153
 See PROPOSAL BY BRAZIL, ECUADOR AND PARAGUAY, RELATING TO LIMITATIONS 
AND EXCEPTIONS: TREATY PROPOSED BY THE WORLD BLIND UNION (WBU), (WIPO 
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights 2009) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/sccr_18_5.pdf; and, AFRICAN 
GROUP, DRAFT WIPO TREATY ON EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR THE DISABLED, 
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the insufficiency of international intellectual property instruments on to 
meet development needs. 
Although it may seem reasonable for developed countries to strive for an 
adequate level of enforcement for intellectual property, that is not the case 
for developing countries. If developed countries want developing countries 
to cooperate in the enforcement of intellectual property, it is necessary to 
work on an agenda that provides the latter with enough flexibility to meet 
their needs. Otherwise, the international regulation of intellectual property 
will accentuate current inequities, seriously risk its own legitimacy, and 
exclude developing countries from effective enforcement. Any enforcement 
agenda that does not include the interests of developing countries will be 
unable to count with their support. In this context, future negotiations of 
international copyright instruments must incorporate new flexibilities for 
development purposes, particularly in the case of the already forty-year old 
Paris Act of the Berne Convention. 
B. Providing Opportunities for Authors and Rights Holders 
Every time the adoption of new flexibilities for developing countries is 
discussed in international forums, copyright holders express their concern. 
The core of their objections is that, although the needs of developing 
countries are indeed urgent, it is unfair to ask authors to bear the burden of 
meeting those needs.
154
 Right holders from developing countries also 
oppose the adoption of new flexibilities. In their view, new flexibilities may 
provide foreign authors with a competitive advantage that would ultimately 
undermine domestic creativity. These concerns overstate the potential 
damage and completely ignore the benefits of flexibilities for authors and 
rights holders. 
Translating works into new languages does not only provide access to 
people and opportunities for countries, it also opens new markets for the 
authors of translated works. For example, an adequate mechanism of 
notification may allow authors and right holders to learn about opportunities 
for their works in foreign markets. This way, authors can focus their efforts 
on deciding whether to enter the given local market directly or to allow 
domestic licensees to do so through voluntary licenses. Even if the right 
                                                                                                                                                   
EDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS, LIBRARIES (WIPO Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights 2011) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf  
154
 See LIPSZYC, supra note 140, at 9, 42 (arguing that mechanisms such as the one 
adopted by the Appendix imply a subsidy from the authors to development); see also 
MOUCHET, supra note 22, at 75-78. 
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holder is not in a position to control the translation of works into a foreign 
language, she may still rely on domestic publishers subject to a guarantee 
for the fair payment of royalties. Overall, translating works offers authors 
and copyright holders the opportunity to assess the advantages of entering a 
certain market with the possibility of sharing the risk with an intermediary. 
 
Figure 2: Top Book Exporting Countries by Market Share, 2009. 
SOURCE: CERLALC, El Espacio Iberoamericano del Libro 2010. 
 
A new regime of flexibilities may also provide opportunities for authors 
and right holders different from those available in large markets of 
developed countries. Although some developing countries have big 
markets, most have modest markets with small and medium size publishers, 
limited editions, and a reduced demand. The current mechanism adopted by 
the Appendix underestimates the limitations of most developing countries’ 
markets and, instead, works under the assumption that these markets are as 
voluminous as those in developed countries. Figure 2 shows market size of 
top book exporting countries. In that pie chart, Latin America and the 
Caribbean represent barely 2.7% of the total, while African countries are 
only a 0.3%. Moreover, there are significant differences among developing 
countries’ markets. For instance, Figure 3 shows that 77.7% of the Latin 
American book production is concentrated in four economies. 
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Figure 3: Latin American Production of Titles, 2009. 
SOURCE: CERLALC, El Espacio Iberoamericano del Libro 2010. 
To provide opportunities for authors and right holders, a new regime of 
flexibilities needs to recognize the limitations of developing countries’ 
markets. For instance, as mentioned above, several Central American 
countries have compulsory licenses for translating and reproducing works 
that remain useless due in part to a lack of domestic publishers and reduced 
size of markets. In El Salvador, a country with around six million people, 
three of the only five existing publishing companies release less than twenty 
titles per year.
155
 Similarly, in Chile, the average print run of a book is less 
than 500 copies.
156
 The transactional costs of using the Appendix are too 
high for publishers from developing countries that operate in these small 
capacities and market sizes. 
Despite market limitations of developing countries, there are two market 
concepts that help explain how developing countries still offer opportunities 
for authors and right holders: niche market and economies of scale. A niche 
market is a fraction of the market formed by a reduced number of 
consumers with similar and easily identifiable needs. For instance, readers 
of Mapudungun, a language spoken by around 500,000 people mainly in the 
Southern of Chile constitute a niche market.
157
 The size of this specific 
                                                          
155
 See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 75 (noting that, according 
to 2009 statistics, 68% of Latin-American publishers publish less than 20 books per year, 
and only 5% publish more than 100 books per year). 
156
 See AGENCIA CHILENA INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER, INFORME 
ESTADÍSTICO 2010 35-36 (2011), available at 
http://www.camaradellibro.cl/archivos/estadisticas/isbn2010.pdf (stating that less than 500 
copies per book has been the prevailing number in Chile during last decade, and it 
represents 53.57% of the 2010 production). 
157 
See Fernando Zúñiga, Mapudunguwelaymi am? "¿Acaso ya no hablas 
Mapudungun?": Acerca del Estado Actual de la Lengua Mapuche, 105 ESTUDIOS 
PÚBLICOS 9, 9 (2007) (discussing the number of speakers of Mapudungun and concluding 
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market is extremely reduced when compared to a typical market in 
developed countries. Because of their size, large-scale providers usually 
disregard niche markets; this, in turn, allows small providers the 
opportunity to offer goods and services tailored for those consumers. 
Authors and right holders that cannot or do not wish to exploit niche 
markets on their own may do so through voluntary and/or compulsory 
licensees. 
A niche market must be small enough to be disregarded by big providers, 
but big enough to appeal to small providers.  For example, there are around 
100,000 Guarani speakers in Argentina. This number is too small to 
incentivize the translation and reproduction of works. If the number of 
Guarani speakers and potential consumers increases, however, reproducing 
translated books may be attractive because the cost of unit production 
decreases when the number of produced units increases. For instance, if it 
were possible to compound Argentinean, Brazilian and Paraguayan Guarani 
speakers, we would be looking at a market of around 6 million potential 
readers.
158
 This market would surely be attractive for some providers and, 
therefore, for authors and right holders of works translated into that 
language. 
The mechanism of the Appendix should recognize the benefits of 
economies of scale that result from aggregating demand from different 
countries.
159
 Unfortunately, this is not the case. First, the export of works 
produced under the Appendix mechanism is prohibited.
160
 Although the 
Appendix provides for some exceptions to this ban, numerous requirements 
                                                                                                                                                   
that it is in such a linguistic precariousness that if no public policies and private initiatives 
address it in short-term the language may disappear). 
158
 Paraguay has a singular situation in Latin America in which a native language is 
mainstream. Of more than 6 million habitants, 90% speak Guarani while only 55% speak 
Spanish. Guarani is also the main native language in the publishing sector in Latin 
America, around 80% of the books published in native languages in the region between 
2005 and 2009 were in Guarani, totaling 258 titles.  See Fomento del Libro America 
Latina, supra note 60, at 62, 66. 
159
 See FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 43 (suggesting that exportation should be allowed to 
countries with “similar level of development which are not covered by the original copies 
and which have made the declaration required by the Appendix.”); see also, Revision of 
the Universal Copyright Convention 1973, supra note 33, at ¶ 32 (referring to an African 
proposal for allowing developing countries having a common language to obtain a joint 
compulsory license, which was not approved).  
160
 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV (4) (a); see STEWART, supra 
note 141, at 164 (stating that the intended purpose of this restriction was preventing works 
produced in developing countries from being available in markets of developed countries 
and undercutting authorized copies there). However, the restriction on exporting applies 
not only when sending works from a developing to a developed country but from any 
country to another.  
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have made the exceptions effectively inoperable.
161
 Second, although 
offshore printing is technically allowed,
162
 overcoming border measures can 
be extremely difficult for works reproduced under a license issued by 
foreign authorities. These types of limitations diminish the possibility of 
using an economy of scale approach to countries that share a language. For 
instance, small Portuguese speaking countries
163
 cannot import works 
translated and reproduced into Portuguese in Brazil under a compulsory 
license issued by Brazilian authorities.
164
 Spanish-speaking countries of the 
Americas, French-speaking countries of Africa, and Arabic-speaking 
countries of the Middle East are in the same situation. 
Some scholars from developing countries argue that mechanisms such as 
the Appendix force domestic authors to compete with foreign authors on 
unfavorable terms.
165
 This argument is wrong, if not misleading. Its 
proponents erroneously assume that works available under a compulsory 
license do not generate copyright royalties for right holders. Those works, 
however, must pay royalties. The Berne Convention requires payment of 
                                                          
161
 Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV (4) (c). 
162
 Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. IV (4) (a) and IV (5) (setting forth 
that publication and reproduction under compulsory license are valid only in the country 
that has issued the license, but omitting any mention to printing); see LIPSZYC, supra note 
140, at 17 - 26 (referring that Argentina proposed an express restriction off shore printing, 
but it did not prosper); Roger Fernay, Paris 1971 ou les aventures d‟un “package deal”, in 
70 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 32-33 (1971) (referring to the 
possibility of printing overseas as a concession in favor of developing countries that lack 
manufacturing capacities); FOMETEU, supra note 59, at 25 (mentioning that overseas 
printing is allowed by the Appendix, but subject to some restrictions); and, ULMER, supra 
note 24, at 357-359, 362 (stating the exportations are forbidden in principle, but allowed in 
some cases, such as when countries lack capacities); See also, General Report of Pais 
Conference 1971, supra note 35, ¶ 40; Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention 
1973, supra note 33, ¶¶ 74, 114 and 115; and, WIPO, supra note 14, p. 168. But see 
FICSOR, Copyright and Transfer of Knowledge, supra note 142, at 11 (stating that copies 
must be printed in the developing country that issued the license).  
163
 Four of the eight countries that have Portuguese as an official language are not 
parties of the Berne Convention: Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome e Principe, and Timor-
Leste.  
164
 For accuracy, Brazil does not have any specific exception or compulsory licensing 
system for purposes of translation and reproduction of works in foreign language into 
Portuguese or any other native language. See Pedro de Paranaguá Moniz, Excepciones y 
Limitaciones al Derecho de Autor en Brasil: Logrando un Equilibrio entre la Protección y 
el Acceso al Conocimiento, in ACCESO A LA CULTURA Y DERECHOS DE AUTOR 55-62 
(Alberto Cerda Silva ed., 2008) (referring to the lack of Appendix-like compulsory 
licensing in Brazilian copyright law, but the convenience of adopting this system in spite of 
its complexities); See also, Pedro Mizukami et al, Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright 
in Brazil: A Call for Reform, en Shaver, Lea (ed.), Access to Knowledge in Brazil: New 
Research on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development, (London, Bloomsbury, 
2010), pp. 41-78. 
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compensation according to “standards of royalties normally operating on 
licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two countries 
concerned.”166 Calculating royalties according to the formula established in 
the Appendix is highly restrictive. The rates of developed countries drive 
average royalty rates up which increases the cost of access for developing 
countries. Moreover, higher rates undermine a wide dissemination of 
knowledge and ultimately force developing countries to give up a given 
content. Abiding by domestic royalties should not damage the interests of 
foreign authors and other right holders. Domestic royalties simply are 
sources of income the authors are not receiving because their works are not 
exploited in domestic markets abroad. Then, using this formula would not 
harm domestic right holders either; in terms of copyright royalties, they 
would be competing on an equal plain with foreign authors.  
Detractors of flexibilities for developing countries argue that facilitating 
the translation and reproduction of works into foreign languages may 
destroy booming markets for the main colonial languages: English, French, 
and Spanish. Although there is no data available about the actual size and 
functioning of those markets as a whole, there is data about some specific 
countries. It is fair to say that the main book exporting countries are in the 
best position to become the main translation producers, because they have 
broader manufacturing and publishing capacities. As figure 2 showed, the 
United States controls more than 16% of the exports.
167
 In contrast, less 
than 3% of the US’ entire production are translations.168 Moreover, 
according to data collected by the University of Rochester, in 2010 only 317 
books translated into English were published; 48 of those were originally 
written in Spanish.
169
 The United Kingdom, the world’s second largest book 
                                                                                                                                                   
165
 See Lipszyc, supra note 140, at 44 (supporting this argument, by expressing that, 
“unprotected foreign works substitute domestic ones”). 
166
 Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, art. IV.6 a) (i). 
167
 See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 172. 
168
 See THREE PERCENT: A RESOURCE FOR INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE AT ROCHESTER 
UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.rochester.edu/College/translation/threepercent/index.php?s=database (last 
visited: May 16, 2011) (suggesting, however, that 3% is a number a little high, since it may 
include not only first-time translated books, but also books that have been printed and 
translated several time, such as classical literature).  
169
 In 2008, 362 translated books were published into English, 48 of them were 
originally written in Spanish; in 2009, 357 translated books were published into English, 62 
of them were originally written in Spanish. See THREE PERCENT: A RESOURCE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE AT ROCHESTER UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.rochester.edu/College/translation/threepercent/index.php?s=database (last visit: 
May 16, 2011)  (limiting statistics to original translations published or distributed in the 
United States). 
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exporter with a 15,9% market share,
170
 only published 93 books translated 
from Spanish in 2007.
171
 These numbers suggests that, even in the case of 
main colonial languages that enjoy the benefits of economies of scale, 
voluntary licenses for translation are still limited. These numbers also 
indicate that the existing international legal framework does not facilitate 
translations from one language to another. 
Available data from Latin-American countries shows that translations are 
few and mostly of works written originally in English. In 2008, of 46,993 
books published in Brazil. 6,626 were translations into Portuguese and 
60.1% of these were from English sources.
172
 The same year, of 6,469 
books published in Mexico, only 164 were translations into Spanish, and 
66% of these were from English sources.
173
 Similarly, in 2010, 5,107 books 
were published in Chile; 302 of them were translations into Spanish, 77.5% 
of which from originals in English.
174
 The relatively high numbers of 
translations from English in Brazil may be explained because few countries 
speak Portuguese and, therefore, Brazil cannot satisfy its domestic demand 
with books published in other countries. English is the main language 
translated into Spanish and Portuguese in Latin American because English 
is the predominant language in technical and commercial fields.
175
  
The absence of book translations in developing countries impairs public 
access and, consequently, the satisfaction of development needs. The lack 
of translations is also detrimental for authors and right holders who cannot 
tap new markets to exploit their works. A new international legal instrument 
must allow properly functioning market niches and economies of scale to 
cure this deficiency.  
 
                                                          
170
 See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 101. 
171
 See Oficina Económica y Comercial de España en Londres, Las traducciones de 
libros del español al inglés en Reino Unido aumentan un 50% en tres años (Dec. 5, 2007), 
available at 
http://www.icex.es/icex/cda/controller/pageICEX/0,6558,5518394_5519005_5604470_403
6437,00.html (referring an increase of 50% from 2004, when only 63 translations were 
made, to 2007). 
172
 See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 43, 84. 
173
 Id. 
174
 See AGENCIA CHILENA INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER, supra note 156, 
at 12, 30. 
175
 See Fomento del Libro America Latina, supra note 60, at 99 (referring to a 2010 
study by Index Translationum that states English is the predominant source language with 
55% of the translations). 
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V. WORKING ON A NEW INSTRUMENT TO MEET DEVELOPMENT NEEDS 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention intended to meet the needs of 
developing countries by providing access to copyrighted works to facilitate 
their development. Unfortunately, the Appendix failed.
176
 Although 
scholars tend to agree on the inefficacy of the Appendix, there is no 
agreement about how this inefficacy can be overcome. Some scholars have 
expressed skepticism on whether the Convention can be changed to meet 
the needs of developing countries. This group suggests that a solution must 
be found in other forums or international instruments.
177
 Other scholars, 
instead, have argued in favor of modifying the Convention to meet 
development needs.
178
   
Based on the current Appendix mechanism, this section outlines a 
proposal for a new instrument that meets development needs.  This proposal 
recommends extending the scope of beneficiaries, diversifying the legal 
mechanisms that provide flexibility, reducing and simplifying the 
bureaucratic requirements, embracing technology opportunities, allowing 
exports, and improving the capacity building of the competent international 
organization. Lastly, the section considers several factors to take into 
account in choosing an international forum for advancing the proposal. 
A. Expanding the Scope of Beneficiaries 
Development needs are not exclusive to developing countries. Different 
minority groups, but linguistic minorities in particular, require special 
copyright flexibilities in both developing and developed countries. 
                                                          
176
 See also RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886 – 1986, supra note 22, at 663 (making similar argument when 
evaluating the usefulness of the Appendix). But see WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 268 ¶ 5.204 (2
nd
 ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/ (suggesting that the Appendix may favorably 
influence negotiation and may lead to increased scope for voluntary licensing), and Mihály 
FICSOR, supra note 142, at 10-11 (refusing the argument that the Appendix has favored 
voluntary licensing and arguing, instead, that developing countries seem trapped in the 
complex and bureaucratic rules of the Appendix and raises doubts about the actual 
existence of these compulsory licenses). 
177
 See, e.g., Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright 
Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 800 (2003) (arguing that the Berne 
Convention does not meet the needs of developing countries, that any radical reforms may 
affect the foundations of the system as it, and, therefore, the Berne Convention should be 
repealed); ALAN STORY, AN ALTERNATIVE PRIMER ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: EIGHTEEN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 63 (2009); 
DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 78 (stating that if developing countries were to 
meet their needs, “they would have to do so outside the Berne system.”) 
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Therefore, the Appendix made a mistake when it limited the scope of its 
intended flexibilities to developing countries. 
A new instrument must adopt a more holistic approach that recognizes 
that development challenges have an effect in countries at all levels of 
development. This approach would allow the expansion of copyright 
flexibilities to communities that cannot fully realize the potential of its 
members, regardless of the country where the community is located. The 
issue of formulating international intellectual property regulations that cut 
across development lines is not new. For instance, TRIPS allowed 
countries, regardless of their development status, to issue compulsory 
licenses to manufacture pharmaceutical products.
179
 This solution arose as a 
result of the recognition that manufacturing capacities are essentially 
relative and, therefore, they do not correspond to either developed or 
developing countries alone. To some extent, the aforementioned “ten-year 
regime” clause of the Berne Convention also recognizes the mistake of 
distinguishing between developing and developed countries when providing 
copyright flexibilities. This provision allows any accessing country to 
substitute the exclusive right of translation for the lapsing of copyright if a 
work is not available in a language in general use in the said country within 
ten years from its first publication. Unfortunately, because of its severe 
restrictions, this special regime has become useless too.
180
  
It may be argued that domestic law rather than international instruments 
should address the challenges faced by particular communities within a 
country. This approach might be effective in some cases. For instance, 
China allows the translation from the dominant Han into any other minority 
nationality language within the country. This type of domestic solution, 
however, has a local scope. The Chinese mechanism is limited to works of 
Chinese authorship, because the Appendix protects foreign authors. It 
would be difficult for China to extend its pro-access policy to works of 
foreign authorship and remain compliant with its international commitments 
through the Appendix or by implementing a copyright exception. 
An adequate solution to address development needs, particularly in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
178
 See, e.g. CHON, supra note 82, at 218-249. 
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 See WTO General Council, Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1 
(Aug. 30, 2003), available at 
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case of oppressed minorities, should go beyond the governmental issuance 
of compulsory licenses. An effective solution must allow minority members 
to apply for compulsory licenses directly to an international organization in 
order to bypass the limitations or negligence of their government. Currently, 
there are several mechanisms that authorize nationals to appeal directly to 
an international organism, such as the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission, UNESCO, and even WIPO itself. 
In sum, a new instrument for providing flexibilities for development 
must not be limited to developing countries. Rather, a new instrument 
should encompass developing communities. Moreover, a new instrument 
should establish a mechanism for minorities to obtain compulsory licenses 
from their government or an international body if their government neglects 
or denies unreasonably their request. 
B. Diversifying the Available Mechanisms 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention sets forth a system of 
compulsory licensing for the translation and reproduction of copyrighted 
works for educational and researching purposes.
181
 In one case, the 
Appendix emphasizes that the use must be non-profit.
182
 This system of 
licensing does not authorize free use. Instead, the Appendix authorizes 
compulsory uses with a just compensation to right holders.
183
 Again, the 
Appendix has a reduced scope and real impact because it does not authorize 
the for-profit exploitation of a copyrighted work, even when a licensee must 
pay compensation to the right holder. 
Compulsory licensing could be a reasonable solution for commercial 
and/or for-profit uses of a copyrighted work. The Appendix does not allow 
for those kinds of uses and adopts instead a torturous solution for essentially 
non-profit translation and reproduction. The Appendix creates an absurd 
situation where some countries, instead of implementing the Appendix 
mechanism to provide a wide dissemination of content, have adopted 
exceptions and limitations that run short of meeting that purpose because 
they are subject to the three-step test.
184
 Moreover, the Appendix creates the 
paradox that some developing countries have worse conditions of access to 
copyrighted works than developed countries.
185
 At the same time, the 
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 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, Appendix, arts. II.5 and III.7 b. 
182
 See id., at art. II.9(a)(iv) 
183
 See id., at art. IV.6(a) 
184
 See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.   
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 See, e.g., CHON, supra note 82, at 218-249 (referring the paradox that the U.S. and 
some European Union countries provide better conditions of access under exceptions than 
those available for inhabitants of developing countries).  
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Appendix has produced the unintended effect that most developing 
countries have restricted themselves to adopt a solution based on limitations 
and exceptions to copyright. 
A new attempt to provide flexibilities for the translation and 
reproduction of works for satisfying development needs must make a 
reasonable distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit uses. For 
example, a new instrument should (1) limit compulsory licensing (i.e., 
compensated authorization) to translation and reproduction for commercial 
purposes; and (2) adopt exceptions and limitations (i.e., free authorizations) 
for translation and reproduction for personal, educational, research, and 
other non-commercial purposes. Assuming the cost of licensing is fair in a 
for-profit entrepreneurship, but may overwhelm not-for-profit initiatives. 
The Appendix should acknowledge that difference, even when that 
distinction can be unclear in borderline activities. 
It has been said that a compulsory licensing system is not efficient 
because it leads to stagnation as it erodes the needed flexibilities of any 
legal regime.
186
 That is only partially true. The traumatic experience of the 
United States with the everlasting compulsory license for mechanical 
reproduction is probably the paradigm of that argument.
187
 However, in 
comparative law it is possible to find compulsory licensing regimes that are 
much more flexible, both in their pricing and procedure.
188
 Therefore, 
preserving a compulsory licensing system does not necessarily mean 
adopting a mechanism that cannot adapt to new challenges. 
In addition to exceptions and compulsory licenses, the “ten-year regime” 
should be more flexible. Currently, this clause allows the lapsing of 
copyright if a work is not available in a language of general use in a given 
country ten years from its first publication. There are four modifications 
that can render this provision more effective. First, reducing the term in 
which the work must be available in the mentioned language. Second, 
allowing any developing country to abide by the provision, either at 
adhesion to the Convention or later. Third, guaranteeing compatibility with 
                                                          
186
 See Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three "Golden Oldies": 
Property Rights, Contracts, and Markets, 508 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 9 (2004) (stating that 
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 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1308-1316 (1996) (arguing 
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 See, e.g., LIPSZYC, supra note 19, at 243-244 (mentioning that fee for using works 
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the provision on compulsory licenses for translation and/or reproduction of 
works. Fourth, banning retaliation against authors whose countries of origin 
have implemented this mechanism. These amendments may partially satisfy 
the need developing countries have to widely disseminate works for 
purposes of teaching, scholarship, and research. 
C. Providing an Unequivocal Solution for Digital Environments 
The applicability of the Appendix to digital environments is, to say the 
least, unclear. While the Berne Convention provides a standard for 
evaluating the adoption of copyright limitations and exceptions in the 
context of new technologies, its Appendix does not provide uncontested 
rules to allow developing countries to take advantage of new opportunities 
in technology. Instead, the myth of the Internet as the perfect borderless 
photocopy machine has pervaded legal literature and prejudicing policy 
makers against flexibilities for the digital environment. 
In contrast to the early beginnings of digital networks, today’s Internet is 
a space as susceptible to regulation as any other non-digital environment. In 
addition to legal and contractual rules, an increasing number of 
technological measures contribute to control and discipline the behavior of 
Internet users. It is technically possible to control accessing, using, and 
copying contents. It is also possible to adjust the online experience to the 
local legal framework of a certain geographical location.
189
 Moreover, 
anonymity is certainly no longer a default feature of online 
communications. 
In addition to the experience of Yahoo!, Google, and iTunes with 
geographical localization systems, it may be extremely useful to survey the 
experiences of other initiatives that provide public access to copyrighted 
contents. To comply with copyright constraints, those initiatives  adopted 
sophisticated operational models. For example, Open Library is an initiative 
that negotiated particular terms of licensing with publishers to make books 
available online. An interesting feature of this initiative is that digital books 
behave just like paper books: they are susceptible to temporal public 
borrowing; multiple copies are not available simultaneously; each book is 
only available to a single person on a one-by-one system. Users must go to 
a participating library or other places with accredited IP connections to 
download books on their devices for a specific period of time, after which 
access to the books is deactivated. Currently, Open Library works in several 
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public and university libraries throughout the United States, Canada and, 
recently, Guatemala. The Open Library initiative suggests that, with proper 
technological and legal support, developing countries may provide broader 
access to copyrighted material for their population. 
However, the international legal framework is still somewhat evasive of 
the possibility of providing a mechanism that allows using digital 
environments as platforms to access copyrighted material in developing 
countries. If voluntary licenses are not granted, the Appendix seems 
insufficient to meet development needs. A new international instrument 
must clearly state its application to digital environments,
190
 and 
unequivocally allow digital reproduction and online access. Moreover, a 
new international legal instrument must establish limitations and conditions 
of such access, specify the status online automatic translation services, and 
govern the technological measures that control access and use of 
copyrighted material. 
An effective solution to provide legal flexibilities for using works on 
online environments must take into account the risk of improper use of 
technologies. Therefore, developing countries should implement regulation 
that prevents illegal use of copyrighted works.  Denying access for some 
cases may be fair if it is, instead, properly provided in others. In this sense, 
a new mechanism must balance the competitive interests of authors, right 
holders, users, and communities. In creating such a balance, the price that 
developing countries may be forced to pay is the provision of protection and 
effective enforcement in cases of illegal use of copyrighted material. 
D. Simplifying Legal Paperwork and Requirements 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention delivers a compulsory licensing 
system for developing countries that is extremely bureaucratic because it 
was created on the suspicion that developing countries would misapply the 
flexibilities.
191
 To prevent such theoretical abuse, the Appendix adopted 
several restrictions that apply both at the international and domestic levels. 
This superposition of requirements makes the framework labyrinthine. The 
system is plagued with categories of works, terms, languages, and so on. As 
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a result, one scholar has qualified this regime as “unworkable.”192 
At the international level, a developing country that wants to enjoy the 
provisions of the Appendix must not only notify WIPO’s General Director, 
it must also renew this notification periodically.
193
 When countries have not 
complied with the notification process at the international level, it is unclear 
whether individuals can obtain a license according to domestic law.
194
 This 
is the case for publishers in Latin American countries that have 
implemented the Appendix mechanism without notifying WIPO. 
At the national level, countries must implement the Appendix provisions 
into their domestic law. As a result, countries must carefully adopt a 
complex system of rules on categories of works, languages, terms, quality 
of translations, etc. Potential licensees have to handle that confusing 
regulation. In addition, it is necessary to create a procedure for appearing 
before judicial or administrative authorities that generally lack experience 
regarding these matters. 
Overall, such requirements discourage national publishers from 
developing countries from using the Appendix mechanism. These 
requirements add new and significant publishing costs to those already in 
existence, such as remuneration to translators and compensation to right 
holders. In the small markets of developing countries, the additional cost of 
Appendix mandated procedures to obtain a compulsory license substantially 
increases the final cost of any publishing initiative. As a result, transactional 
costs make the Appendix mechanism unviable. 
A new international instrument must provide developing countries with 
an uncomplicated mechanism through the following measures. Unnecessary 
bureaucratic paperwork, such as the WIPO notice renewals should be 
deleted. Instead, the mechanism can adopt a more straightforward 
notification procedure similar to the one set forth for compulsory licensing 
in TRIPS.
195
 Other improvements could include standardizing rules, 
particularly on terms and categories of work, and removing protectionist 
measures for colonial languages.
196
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 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for 
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  See supra note 179. 
196
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Technology could help improve the system. As noted previously, the 
new international instrument must state clearly its application to digital 
works and online environment. Similarly, the instrument must incorporate 
technology to facilitate its application, management, and issuance of 
licenses. An online, open, and comprehensive system of information similar 
to the one available for domain name system could achieve this goal.
197
 
Such a database would allow public and global research of and notification 
to authors and copyright holders of works susceptible of being licensed. 
Such system would also enable local authorities to coordinate their actions 
and facilitate communications between potential licensees and licensors. 
Finally, this database would introduce transparency in the functioning of the 
system, which so far is missing from the Appendix. 
E. Allowing Exportations 
The Appendix mechanism ban on the exportation of works is excessive. 
The ban originally intended to prevent works produced under compulsory 
license to flood markets around the world. The ban has, however, 
undermined the use of the mechanism in countries that lack manufacturing 
capacities and in countries with small markets. Although the Appendix 
allows overseas printing,
198
 this measure is not useful when the market of 
the licensor country is small. The Appendix also sets forth exceptions that 
allow works to be exported from one country to another.
199
 But these 
exceptions have lost their effect because they are extremely narrow and 
bureaucratic.
200
 
A new mechanism for development must recognize the advantages of 
economies of scale, particularly for small developing economies, and allow 
the export of works produced under compulsory licenses. Some authors in 
favor of exportations have limited their support to developing countries that 
have issued compulsory licenses.
201
 However, if the new mechanism seeks 
to meet development needs rather than only the needs of developing 
countries, exports should not be limited to developing countries. For 
instance, the export of certain goods would contribute to meeting the needs 
of developing communities in developed countries, such as Amharic or 
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Mapudungun speakers in the United States. Moreover, requiring licensing 
from a new country when the work is already available creates unnecessary 
bureaucracy, redundancy of efforts, and artificial barriers for the free flow 
of goods. 
The new mechanism must also remove obstacles for the free flow of 
copyrighted goods. Traditionally, custom authorities have had power to 
limit the flow of goods that infringe on intellectual property only in the 
exporting or importing countries. In recent years, however, customs 
authorities’ competence over in-transit goods has expanded.202 If the new 
mechanism allows exportation, then customs authorities from in-transit 
countries should not interfere with the free flow as long as the works 
comply with customs regulations of the exporting and importing countries.  
F. Improving Institutional Support 
Competent international organizations on copyright must play a more 
relevant role in implementing a solution for development in order to ensure 
a wide dissemination of knowledge. Despite the high expectations of the 
1970s, under the Appendix, WIPO has played only a minor role on this 
matter.
203
 The mere fact that the Appendix mechanism is still 
misunderstood by its beneficiaries and that there has not been any critical 
study about it provide enough evidence of WIPO’s precarious involvement. 
For those who have been involved with WIPO capacity building programs, 
the absence of assistance on flexibilities for developing countries is 
astonishing.
204
 
A well-drafted mechanism should specify the role of an international 
institution in capacity building of publishers, distributors, booksellers, 
authors and right holders from countries or communities that wish to benefit 
from the new flexibilities.  In addition, the competent international 
organization must also provide technical assistance to governments in the 
incorporation of flexibilities into domestic law. Moreover, the international 
entity could play a more active role in providing technological and financial 
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 See e.g., Anti- Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 16, Dec. 3, 2010, available 
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support, advice on good practices, and critical analysis on the effective 
functioning of the system. 
The competent international organization should also be able to improve 
access to copyrighted works by developing countries and communities. For 
example, the organization could issue compulsory licenses on its own right. 
Doing so would contribute to a wider dissemination of knowledge in 
countries where governments are reluctant or negligent in issuing licenses 
or lack the capacity to implement the international instrument. Moreover, 
internationally issued licenses would relieve some of the pressure that 
developing countries experience when they attempt to implement 
flexibilities into their domestic laws. 
G. Choosing an International Forum  
Choosing the best forum for adopting a new international instrument 
flexibilities for development requires considering political and legal issues, 
timing and the schedules of the different possible forums. Rather than 
providing a firm answer to this question, this section reflects some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different alternatives. 
The first temptation is to consider revising the Appendix, and possibly 
the Universal Copyright Convention, because they both regulate the 
compulsory licensing in favor of developing countries. However, modifying 
them would be extremely complex because it would entail the organization 
of a conference and unanimous approval.
205
 The 1971 Paris Conference 
required preparation that started practically at the very end of its previous 
1967 Stockholm Conference. Since then, several attempts to update the 
Berne Convention have failed, even when they counted on the right holders 
support. Developed countries have circumvented the complexities of 
modifying the Berne Convention by adopting new instruments before 
WIPO and WTO. The Berne Convention has become a fossil that reminds 
us of the copyright standard of the industrial era. Any improvement must 
follow another path. 
Another possibility is adopting a new international instrument on 
flexibilities for development before WIPO. Currently this international 
organism, part of the United Nations system, works on several proposals 
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regarding international instruments on copyright.
206
 So far, the most 
advanced proposal concerns granting access to copyrighted works for 
people with disabilities. In spite of its narrow purposes, developed countries 
have strongly opposed this proposal. This experience suggests that an 
instrument with a broader purpose, such as providing flexibilities for 
development needs, may face enormous resistance in that forum. 
 The WTO is yet another alternative. This international organization 
already has experience providing flexibilities in the enforcement of TRIPS. 
The WTO allows countries to issue a compulsory license for 
pharmaceutical products in case they lack the capacity to manufacture them. 
Although this exception was originally a temporary mechanism,
207
 it later 
became a permanent modification to TRIPS.
208
 In this sense, the WTO 
shows a successful adoption of flexibilities and some level of commitment 
in evaluating their implementation and functioning in both TRIPS and the 
domestic law of WTO members. Moreover, TRIPS has an enforcement 
mechanism that is lacking in the Berne Convention. Finally, TRIPS also has 
a larger number of members than the Berne Convention, which suggests a 
wide base of potential application for a new instrument.  
Adopting an international instrument that provides flexibilities to meet 
development needs may take a long time. This is more likely if developed 
countries show the resistance they did during the negotiations that 
concluded with the adoption of the Appendix. Therefore, it may be 
advisable to work initially on a narrower instrument. For instance, seeking 
an agreement at the regional or sub-regional level, such as within the 
Common Market of the South
209
 or the South American Community of 
Nations.
210
 This narrower approach may create important opportunities for 
granting wider access to sources of knowledge with some additional 
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positive externalities. For example, empowering regional and native 
cultures by promoting the preservation of their linguistic heritage. 
Currently, 16% of the translations published in Brazil are from books 
initially available in Spanish;
211
 that number may increase under an 
adequate instrument. Language minorities from neighboring countries also 
may enjoy the benefits of economies of scale, such as between 
Mapudungun speakers of Argentina and Chile; Guarani speakers of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay; Aymara speakers of Bolivia, Chile, and 
Peru, and so on. 
Although not fully satisfactory, a regional instrument may be a first step 
to adopt an international instrument that provides enough flexibility for a 
wider dissemination of knowledge. 
 
VI. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Appendix of the Berne Convention intended to provide some 
flexibility for developing countries in order to meet their needs for a wider 
dissemination of knowledge. The Appendix’s system of compulsory 
licensing, however, has proven to be inefficient. Developing countries have 
not adopted the bureaucratic and limited mechanism of the Berne 
Convention. Rather, many of these countries have devised idiosyncratic 
solutions in their domestic laws. In addition, the Appendix creates legal 
uncertainty about its application to the online environment.  Furthermore, 
the Appendix falls short of providing solutions that effectively meet 
development needs, particularly those of cultural and linguistic minorities. 
These criticisms should be enough to encourage the adoption of a new 
solution for developing countries. However, adopting such a mechanism 
may also allow the advancement of general welfare goals related to the 
protection of intellectual property by developed countries. A new 
mechanism may even lead to new opportunities for authors and right 
holders. 
Any new solution for addressing the needs of developing countries must 
be informed by the lessons learned from the failure of the Appendix of the 
Berne Convention. For instance, a new international instrument must 
   
 Extend the scope of provisions to both developing 
countries and developing communities in developed 
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countries.  
 Provide diverse legal mechanisms, beyond nationally 
issued compulsory licenses, for a variety of purposes.  
 Reduce paperwork, bureaucracy, and unnecessary 
safeguards that have made the system in force completely 
unworkable.  
 Take advantage of the opportunities offered by technology 
both for development purposes and for facilitating the 
functioning of the system itself. 
 Engage competent international organizations to play a 
more active role in empowering countries and communities 
to take advantage of the system, providing technical 
assistance and capacity building, among other 
responsibilities. 
 
In its more than forty years in force, the Appendix has failed to meet the 
needs of developing countries. A compromise is urgently required in the 
international copyright law to allow less developed countries and 
communities to participate in the global progress of culture, science, and 
technology.  
 
 
